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1 Pensions and the Labor Market
INTRODUCTION
The study of internal labor markets, also known as "the new eco 
nomics of personnel," has made important contributions to labor eco 
nomics. This research has attempted to explain policies governing 
employee-employer relationships when the job match is productive 
and durable, addressing such questions as, What is the economic basis 
for durable employment relationships? How can compensation and 
promotion policies provide incentives to attract and motivate quality 
employees? When job matches are productive, how can wages and 
benefits simultaneously allocate productivity gains and discourage 
quits and layoffs?
Internal labor market research is in the spirit of the "new institu 
tional economics" (Simon 1991), in that a frequent theme is modeling 
labor market practices and policies as efficient and productivity- 
enhancing solutions to the incentive problems that arise from asym 
metric or incomplete information. Economists have applied this 
approach to wage and employment factors such as earnings that rise 
with tenure, interindustry wage differentials, promotions and bonuses, 
and incentives for early retirement. 1
Pensions are one of the most important workplace institutions. 
Nearly half of all private-sector employees participate in a retirement 
plan, and pension costs are approximately 5 percent of payroll for the 
sponsoring firms (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1994). Most studies of 
private pensions have focused on the advantages of saving for retire 
ment through a pension. Pensions provide a large and growing share 
of income for retirees: 44 percent of all households with persons above 
age 65 received pension income in 1994 (Grad 1996), and this figure is 
estimated to rise to 76 percent by 2018 (Silverman and Yakoboski 
1994). Private pension plans paid $179.4 billion in benefits in 1994 
(EBRI 1997), almost one-third of total retirement payments, and pro 
vided 9 percent of total income for the elderly (Grad 1996).
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The internal labor market perspective suggests that pensions, in 
addition to providing a vehicle for retirement saving, establish incen 
tives that promote productivity. The defined-benefit plan which, 
despite recent trends to greater defined-contribution coverage, is still 
the dominant form of coverage typically rewards long tenure and 
penalizes late retirement. Employees covered by a defined-benefit plan 
maximize their pension wealth by working without breaks in tenure 
until they reach retirement age. A pension loss is incurred by leaving 
either "too early" or "too late." Defined-contribution pensions, by their 
construction, are more neutral towards quit or retirement decisions. 2
This monograph applies the internal labor market perspective to pri 
vate pension incentives. The popularity of defined-benefit coverage- 
well over half of the workers with pensions still are covered by these 
plans argues that pension incentives have important economic func 
tions. Because private pensions are voluntary, and given the availabil 
ity of defined-contribution plans that offer a simpler, lower-cost 
retirement savings vehicle, defined-benefit plans must convey distinct 
advantages. The internal labor market perspective suggests that one of 
the advantages is incentives for higher productivity.
PERSPECTIVES ON PENSIONS
Demand-Side
Why do employers compensate their employees with pensions? A 
large body of research has explored both demand- and supply-oriented 
theories of pension coverage. 3 Demand-side theories start from the 
proposition that employers are indifferent between paying cash wages 
or making contributions to a pension fund, and thus pensions are spon 
sored to satisfy employee demand for a retirement saving vehicle. A 
reduction in income taxes is a well-known reason for employees to pre 
fer pension saving. Employer contributions and the interest and divi 
dend earnings of pension assets are not taxed until benefits are paid. 
Therefore, compensating workers by credibly promising future pen 
sion benefits, rather than the equivalent value of cash wages, can yield 
important tax savings, especially for high-income employees. There is
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much empirical evidence that pension coverage responds to tax incen 
tives.4
Another demand-side theory is that pensions are an insurance policy 
against a number of retirement-age risks. One such risk is that retirees 
will live longer than expected and their savings will be depleted before 
death. The market solution to this risk is an annuity, which pays a fixed 
sum as long as the individual is alive. Adverse selection problems 
arise, however, when annuities are purchased late in life, because older 
persons in poor health will refuse to purchase annuities. Pensions 
solve this problem by requiring workers to, in effect, purchase a retire 
ment annuity when they accept a job and begin participating in the 
plan. At this younger age, differences in expected lifespans are less 
evident.
A third reason why workers prefer pension saving is to shift the risk 
of poor investment performance to the employer. The employer 
appears to assume the risk of adverse asset performance in a defined- 
benefit plan by promising a retirement benefit based upon the worker's 
earnings, rather than the value of the pension fund. If future earnings 
are less variable than asset prices, employees enjoy greater certainty 
about retirement living standards under defined-benefit plans. 5
Other demand-centered pension theories are that economies of scale 
in administering private pensions allow workers to earn higher rates of 
return, net of expenses, by group retirement saving (Mitchell and 
Andrews 1981); and that unions prefer pensions because they dispro 
portionately benefit members with greater seniority (Freeman 1985). 
Evidence that pension coverage, especially through defined-benefit 
plans, is more likely in large, unionized establishments supports these 
theories (Dorsey 1987, for example).
While there are many demand-side theories of defined-benefit plans, 
most defined-contribution plans are consistent only with tax savings. 6 
These plans create a retirement account to which the employer or 
employee make regular contributions. Benefits are based upon the 
value of the assets in the account at retirement, unlike defined-benefit 
plans, which pay an annuity based upon age, earnings, or years of ser 
vice. Retirees also may elect a lump-sum benefit, unlike most defined- 
benefit participants.
Yet, demand-side theories do not address the incentives created by 
pensions, particularly by defined-benefit plans. The tax savings aspect
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could be exploited with the administratively simpler defined-contribu- 
tion plan, and defined-benefit plans could shift risk to employers, with 
age- and earnings-based annuities, without imposing quit or late retire 
ment penalties.
Supply-Side
A supply-side perspective is that pension incentives raise workforce 
productivity and lower labor costs. Internal labor market theories sug 
gest several mechanisms through which pensions promote productiv 
ity. The nonportability of defined-benefit pension wealth penalizes 
quits, an incentive which may promote investments in employee train 
ing. The threat of loss of pension benefits also may discourage shirk 
ing and lower the cost of monitoring employee effort. Pensions, 
whether defined-benefit or defined-contribution, are valued more by 
workers who have low internal discount rates. Many have suggested 
that such forward-looking persons are more productive long-term 
employees.7 In addition, defined-benefit plans are a convenient vehicle 
for rewarding early retirement. With mandatory retirement rules no 
longer legal, pension bonuses are perhaps the only feasible way to 
encourage the early exit of older workers, whose productivity may 
have declined or become more variable.
An alternative supply-side perspective is based on the ability to 
underfund defined-benefit pensions. Underfunding, by definition 
impossible in defined-contribution plans, converts employees into 
unsecured bondholders. Ippolito (1986) has argued that this creates an 
incentive for group productivity gains, particularly in union settings. 
Some financial economists see underfunding as a less expensive source 
of financing than borrowing from outsiders, given imperfect informa 
tion in credit markets. 8
The supply-side view that pensions enhance productivity is prima 
rily a theory of defined-benefit plans, because of the latter's ease of 
establishing incentives for tenure and retirement. Defined-contribution 
plans, however, also can attract workers who have low discount rates. 
Recent empirical pension studies suggest that defined-contribution 
plans also promote favorable labor market outcomes, such as reduced 
quits.
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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRODUCTIVITY THEORY 
OF PENSIONS
Economic studies of pensions frequently assume that defined-bene- 
fit pensions raise productivity.9 This supply-side view follows from the 
economist's presumption that pension incentives must create value suf 
ficient to offset their costs. Constraints on workers' ability to move to 
more attractive jobs or to retire when they wish are costly, requiring 
employers to pay compensating wage premiums to attract workers. In 
firms where pension incentives serve no productive function, employ 
ers could attract workers at a lower cost by offering defined-contribu- 
tion pensions. Alternatively, sponsors could write plan rules to 
increase benefit portability and to eliminate late retirement penalties. 
This reasoning implies that defined-benefit pensions are part of a com 
pensation package in jobs where long tenure or early retirement is pro 
ductive.
In contrast, outside the economics literature, the possibility that pen 
sions may be a tool to enhance productivity is ignored or explicitly dis 
counted in much of the discussion of pensions and pension policy. The 
human resource management perspective almost exclusively sees pen 
sions as driven by employee preferences. For example, we reviewed 
several current human resource management college textbooks and 
found little discussion of the implications of different pension plan 
types for turnover or retirement decisions. Some texts failed even to 
describe the implications of the different incentive structures of 
defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans. 10 No book that we 
reviewed integrated pensions into discussions of designing strategic 
compensation systems. 11 The imperfect portability of benefits gener 
ally was presented as a disadvantage of defined-benefit plans, rather 
than as an intentional compensation policy. Pensions generally were 
discussed in the context of employee benefits, with attention strictly on 
providing for employees' retirement security, and nonportable benefits 
can lower pension wealth. This is a perspective in which pensions are 
exclusively a vehicle for providing retirement income.
The human resource management professional literature also is 
largely silent on the possible advantages of pension incentives. One of 
the authors searched the human resource professional journals and
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found little research on the effect of pension plan choices on employee 
outcomes or performance (Dorsey 1995). Issues of equity and ade 
quacy of replacement rates dominated the discussion of pension plan 
design. Again, nonportability was treated as a shortcoming of defined- 
benefit plans. 12
Human resource professionals also assign little value to pension ten 
ure incentives. Most, however, appreciate the ability of defined-benefit 
plans to encourage early retirement. The following statement by Marc 
W. Twinney, an administrator of a large pension fund, is fairly repre 
sentative of the opinions of benefit professionals:
The primary reason larger, international manufacturing firms pro 
vide private pensions is to remove the older, less efficient 
employee from the work force in a socially responsible way. 
Firms do not provide pensions to recruit... . (or) to tie employees 
to the work force and avoid recruiting or training costs. The fact 
that this occurs is incidental to the primary goal. These secondary 
effects result from controlling the costs of providing retirement 
income and are acceptable to the firm and its employees. (Schmitt 
1993, p. 98.)
Lazear (1990) also concluded that benefit managers primarily under 
stand pensions as retirement savings vehicles, suggesting that they fre 
quently fail even to understand the implications of pension incentives 
on work force outcomes, let alone see them as having strategic value.
Economics is about incentives, so it is not surprising that economists 
are more likely to think about why pension tenure and retirement 
incentives might be useful to firms and workers. Even the economics 
literature, however, often has characterized pension quit penalties as 
impediments to efficient job mobility. Turner (1993) describes two 
arguments for legislation to enhance pension portability. First, greater 
portability will raise retirement benefits of workers who, for whatever 
reason, have experienced frequent or untimely job changes. Second, 
reduced quits induced by nonportability lowers productivity by tying 
workers to jobs where their productivity has fallen due to shifts in con 
sumer tastes or technology shocks.
The latter concern, popularly known as "job lock," has been around 
for some time. Ross (1958) labeled it the "new industrial feudalism." 
Choate and Linger (1986, p. 245) wrote, "Weaknesses in pension avail 
ability, benefits, and portability are now impeding the mobility that is
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so essential during this period of economic and technological turbu 
lence, as an aging work force avoids job changes to protect pension 
rights." The claim that nonportability restricts productive job changes 
implies that pensions are motivated by tax and insurance functions and 
that incentives for long tenure are perhaps an historical accident based 
upon early optimistic assessments of their beneficial effects and pre 
served by institutional rigidity.
The productive value of pension incentives is an important issue in 
the economics of pensions and for evaluating pension policy. Consider 
the debate over pension portability policy. For the past 20 years, the 
United States and Canada have moved toward increasing retirement 
benefit portability. In the United States, the minimum vesting period 
has been lowered twice since 1975 and currently stands at five years. 
Most Canadian provinces now require vesting in defined-benefit plans 
after two years. In addition to mandating greater portability in defined- 
benefit plans, changes in tax and regulatory policy in the United States 
have increased the attractiveness of defined-contribution plans (Clark 
and McDermed 1990), which are by definition more portable. 13 Pen 
sion reform advocates continue to argue for higher portability stan 
dards for defined-benefit pensions. Mandatory portability may raise 
the value of workers' pension wealth 14 and promote job mobility. If 
pension incentives promote long tenure where the latter is productive, 
however, greater portability will have a cost.
An understanding of the productivity view of pensions also is 
needed to interpret and evaluate coverage trends. Primary coverage by 
defined-benefit plans declined from 87 percent of participants in 1975 
to 57 percent in 1993. While the defined-benefit coverage remains 
important, the shift raises important questions. Do plan sponsors 
believe that pension incentives are less important today, i.e., have the 
productivity gains from defined-benefit plans diminished? Or do ris 
ing costs of administering these plans, fueled by federal regulations, 
explain much of the trend? If the latter, does the substitution of 
defined-contribution coverage imply weaker employee/firm attachment 
and lower productivity? Will this trend continue, with defined-benefit 
plans eventually becoming obsolete?
Finally, a clearer understanding of the importance of pension incen 
tives provides a stronger foundation for future pension research. This 
monograph will review labor market models which feature long-term
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employment and will survey previous empirical pension studies. An 
important outcome will be suggestions for future research. We will 
present some new empirical results; however, extensive testing of the 
productivity theory of pensions will require a major investment in data 
collection.
ORGANIZATION OF THIS DISCUSSION
Our analysis of the productivity theory of pensions is in three parts. 
First, we review the history and institutional practices of private pen 
sions and government policy towards pensions. Chapter 2 traces the 
origins of private pensions in the United States and the evolution of 
current coverage. Tax rules and regulations have had a major impact 
on pensions, and this chapter concludes with an overview of federal 
policies. Chapter 3 describes institutional pension practices which cre 
ate incentives. We show how workers who leave a job that has a 
defined-benefit pension are penalized. The advantages of defined-ben- 
efit plans in establishing retirement incentives also are presented. We 
also discuss more recent ideas about how defined-contribution plans 
may convey productive incentives.
Second, we consider whether pension incentives are consistent with 
models of internal labor markets. Chapter 4 reviews employment mod 
els in which specific training and monitoring costs generate job-spe 
cific productivity gains. Mechanisms to discourage early quitting or 
late retirement are needed to enforce long-term employment contracts. 
We compare pension incentives with ideal solutions.
Third, we evaluate empirical evidence that pensions promote pro 
ductivity. Chapter 5 reviews empirical studies which test the pension- 
productivity hypothesis. We find little direct evidence that pensions 
enhance productivity, but a number of studies provide indirect evi 
dence consistent with the hypothesis. This chapter also takes up the 
question of the growing popularity of defined-contribution plans and 
considers whether the declining market share of defined-benefit plans 
is evidence that pension incentives are no longer important.
The next two chapters report new empirical evidence. Chapter 6 
tests a channel through which pensions may enhance worker produc-
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tivity: by promoting investments in worker training. We created a new 
data set by matching Current Population Surveys, allowing us to test 
the prediction of the specific-training model that pensions and training 
are complements. Chapter 7 reports direct estimates of productivity 
gains for firms that sponsor defmed-benefit pensions. We estimate 
parameters of a production function using firm data from the Com- 
pustat file. These are pieces of evidence which advance the empirical 
literature, but significant data and modeling issues will remain.
We will disappoint readers looking for a single, definitive test of the 
productivity theory versus other pension theories. The ideal empirical 
study would be based on a structural model of pension coverage, labor 
force outcomes, and productivity (Figure 1.1). Such a model would 
recognize that pension coverage is endogenous and would test the 
importance of productivity factors against demand-side theories of 
why firms sponsor pensions. It simultaneously would estimate the 
channels through which pension incentives raised productivity, as sug 
gested by long-term employment models: e.g., by encouraging 
employee training. Finally, it would link improved labor force out 
comes to productivity gains. No data set exists which will support 
such a powerful test. 15 This should not be too surprising, given that 
such a data set would allow tests of more basic and direct incentives, 
such as wage policies, that also have eluded economists.
Although our goals are less ambitious than estimating a fully speci 
fied structural model, they are still important: to analyze and explain 
thoroughly the channels through which pensions may promote produc 
tivity; to summarize the existing literature; to advance the empirical lit 
erature with new results; and to help frame future empirical work.
Figure 1.1 A Unified Pension Model
Pension Decision
Demand Side Factors
• Taxes
• Insurance
• Union
Supply Side Outcomes
• Training
•Effort
• Selection effects
Capital 
Labor quality
Productivity
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NOTES
1. An excellent discussion of applying competitive market solutions to internal labor 
market problems of imperfect information and moral hazard is found in Lazear 
(1991). Carmichael (1989) provides a concise discussion of implicit labor con 
tracts. Another fine nontechnical discussion of the internal labor market perspec 
tive is Wachter and Wright (1990).
2. After workers are vested, quit costs are zero in most defined-contribution plans. 
While it may be possible to increase contribution rates with age and tenure, the tax 
advantages of deferring compensation under defined-benefit plans are large com 
pared with backloaded contributions or deferred wages. The reasons why defined- 
benefit plans are a superior vehicle for establishing tenure and retirement incen 
tives are explored in Chapter 3.
3. For surveys of this literature, see Bodie (1990) and Gustman, Mitchell, and Stein- 
meier (1994).
4. Cross-section analyses show a large positive effect of income on pension coverage 
(Dorsey 1982). Alpert (1983), Woodbury and Huang (1991), and Reagan and 
Turner (1994) report that the likelihood of coverage rises with marginal tax rates.
5. Pesando and Hyatt (1992), however, point out that defined-benefit plans do not 
necessarily shield employees from investment risk. They present evidence that 
when lower investment earnings require higher pension contributions, employers 
reduce wage increases or other benefits. There also is direct evidence that ad hoc 
inflation adjustments are more likely when pension fund returns are high (Alien, 
Clark, and McDermed 1992), causing real pension benefits to fall when unex 
pected inflation lowers asset returns.
6. Defined-contribution plans in theory could prohibit lump-sum distributions. In 
practice, 96 percent of defined-contribution beneficiaries in 1989 received at least 
a portion of their benefits as a lump-sum distribution (Turner and Beller 1992).
7. See Ippolito (1998). There is a large body of research in the field of psychology 
which indicates that individuals who are able to delay gratification achieve higher 
levels of success (Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1989).
8. Of course, the reduction in financing costs must be sufficient to offset the tax 
losses when the firm's real pension obligations are underfunded.
9. These studies include, for example, Rice (1966), Blinder (1982), Long and Scott 
(1982), Ippolito (1986), Alien and Clark (1987), Even and Macpherson (1996), 
and Curme and Even (1995).
10. The most detailed presentations of pension incentives was found in Miner and 
Crane (1995).
11. An exception was Noe et al. (1994), who wrote that "The typical pension is 
designed to discourage employee turnover'' (p. 644, our emphasis). They also 
note the importance of pensions as severance payments for firms that are reducing 
the size of their workforce. To provide some perspective, these texts also place 
less emphasis than labor economics on the incentive functions of wages and com- 
pensation policies in general. For example, there also was little mention of
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deferred wages or efficiency wages in chapters on turnover or strategic compensa 
tion.
12. For example, Brennan (1984), in an article on restructuring corporate pension 
plans, recommended switching to a career-average benefit formula to enhance the 
portability of the defined-benefit plan.
13. These trends have been less evident in Canada; however, recent policy changes 
have caused concern that defined-benefit plans may begin to lose popularity there 
as well.
14. Employers may respond to portability requirements by lowering the generosity of 
pensions. Thus, legislation may have no effect on pension wealth or costs.
15. Gustman and Mitchell (1992) present a detailed discussion of the data needed to 
test a structural model of pension coverage. Data that are currently available fall 
well short of these requirements.
2 An Overview 
of Private Pensions and Policy
This chapter briefly describes essential characteristics of the private 
pension system in the United States and the federal tax and regulatory 
policies that have affected pensions. 1 The concept that pensions could 
raise productivity and lower labor costs is hardly new. The first indus 
trial plans were conceived as a human resource management tool. 
Ironically (given the current lack of interest by managers), economic 
historians have concluded that facilitating early retirement and reduc 
ing turnover were the primary stimuli to the first wave of pension adop 
tions in the early twentieth century.
Industrial pensions became widespread just after the turn of the cen 
tury among large employers in railroads, utilities, banking, and manu 
facturing. According to Williamson (1994) and Graebner (1980), firms 
that sponsored pensions before 1910 were primarily motivated by 
retirement concerns. Interest in pensions had grown in the late nine 
teenth century as the idea became widespread that older workers were 
less productive, or even unsafe to fellow employees or customers. 
Older employees generally were perceived as unable to adapt to the 
new, more rigid and physically demanding technologies that were 
spreading across industry at the turn of the century. 2 The traditional 
practice of providing older workers continued employment with 
reduced responsibilities was costly. Yet employers wanted to be per 
ceived as treating older workers fairly in order to maintain the morale 
and loyalty of younger employees. Employers hoped that adopting 
mandatory retirement, complemented by a pension, would enhance 
productivity, safety, and promotion opportunities for younger workers.
An excellent example is the introduction of the first modern pension 
by the Pennsylvania Railroad, described by Gratton (1990). The Penn 
sylvania Railroad, one of the largest employers in the country, insti 
tuted a universal, noncontributory pension in 1900. At the same time, 
workers were required to retire at age 70, and the company also 
adopted an explicit policy of not hiring new employees older than age 
35. Gratton cites persuasive evidence that the railroad's policy was 
driven by a perceived opportunity to cut labor costs by eliminating
13
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older employees from the workforce. Company analysts had estimated 
that older workers were one-third less productive, on average, yet were 
paid one-third more than new hires.
Early pension adopters also were concerned about high turnover, 
which had reached extraordinary levels in manufacturing industries. 
By 1910, hiring and training costs had grown dramatically. Turnover 
rates of 200 percent were not uncommon in manufacturing firms, and 
the turnover rate at Ford Motor Company in Detroit reached 370 per 
cent in 1911 (Slichter 1921).
The "scientific management" philosophy gained momentum during 
this period, spurring pension adoptions. This approach, sometimes 
known as "Taylorism" for its chief proponent, Dr. Frederick Taylor, 
emphasized worker productivity through measurement and explicit 
incentives. In this management environment, pensions were seen as 
raising productivity by reducing turnover. Nonvested, defined-benefit 
pensions spread quickly among large firms in the United States and 
Canada between 1910 and 1930, and Latimer (1932) attributed much 
of this growth to the turnover problem. 3
Graebner (1980, p. 129) reached a similar conclusion, citing the 
example of DuPont Corporation: "Turnover was clearly the dominant 
consideration in DuPont deliberations over a new pension plan in 
1914." A review of internal memoranda revealed that key DuPont offi 
cials believed that a retirement plan would mitigate the company's high 
turnover rate.4 DuPont officials also favored early vesting in order to 
make the program attractive to younger workers.
Graebner (p. 128) quotes a banker friend of Coleman DuPont, who 
advised quick adoption of a pension: "The right sort of pension plan 
comes pretty near being a panacea for most of the ills that exist 
between employer and employee . . . there is hardly any workforce 
problem facing management today that cannot be solved by the adop 
tion of a pension plan."
Other factors, of course, may have contributed to the spread of pen 
sions. Some writers have suggested that an unfunded, unvested pen 
sion discouraged union organization; or that firms were concerned for 
the welfare of older employees who had grown physically unable to 
work, consistent with the view of pensions as retirement income insur 
ance. We could not find any historical evidence, however, suggesting 
that establishing a source of "insider" financing was a factor in early
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pension growth. Early pension adoptions appear to have been driven 
by the concerns of personnel offices.
Optimism about the beneficial effects of pensions was short-lived. 
Latimer (1932) reported that by the end of the 1920s, few managers 
had confidence that pensions did much to lower turnover. He argued 
that, by the late 1920s, the principal economic justification for pen 
sions had evolved into enabling mandatory retirement, a view that 
remains popular with human resource professionals.
Pension coverage grew slowly in industries other than railroads, 
utilities, banking, and manufacturing, and by 1940 the great majority 
of private sector workers still had no private retirement plan. Private 
sector coverage began a steady climb during World War II, however, 
reaching a peak of 45 percent in 1970 (Table 2.1), and 43 percent of 
total private sector workers now are covered under an employer-spon 
sored pension plan. There is evidence that coverage rates may have 
declined slightly since the mid 1970s. 5 The stability of the aggregate 
rates, however, masks a very large decline in coverage for young males 
(Even and Macpherson 1994), while women's coverage rates have 
risen significantly.
While defined-benefit coverage has declined steadily and substan 
tially since 1975, over half of all workers with pensions still have pri 
mary coverage under this type of pension (Table 2.2). Defined-benefit 
plans promise workers a retirement annuity based upon years of ser 
vice and, usually, the worker's highest earnings. Internal Revenue Ser 
vice rules generally prohibit pre-tax employee contributions to a 
pension fund, and most defined-benefit plans do not require employee 
contributions. Since the employee's pension wealth is in the form of a 
promised benefit, defined-benefit plans have rules which specify par 
ticipation, vesting, and benefit eligibility.
Federal law requires that full-time employees who are at least age 
21 with one year of service be allowed to participate, i.e., begin earning 
service credit. Pension vesting rules define the portion of a worker's 
accrued benefit that he or she owns upon leaving the firm. Before fed 
eral regulations were implemented in 1975, nearly half of defined-ben 
efit plans had no provision for vesting separated employees; i.e., 
workers who left before retirement lost all pension benefits (Kolodru- 
betz and Landay 1973). The Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA) required plans to vest employees under a graduated
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Table 2.1 Private Sector Pension Coverage
Year
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1979
1983
1988
1993
Private sector workers 
covered (%)
15
19
25
32
41
43
45
43
41
42
43
Full-time private sector 
workers covered (%)
17
21
29
37
47
49
52
50
47
48
SOURCE: Estimates for 1940-70 were calculated by Beller and Lawrence (1992) and include 
only nonagricultural workers. Estimates for 1979—93 are calculated from pension supplements to 
the Current Population Survey and do not exclude agricultural employees.
Table 2.2 Trends in Pension Plan Type
Year
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Defined-benefit plans 
(% of all plans)
33
30
30
31
29
27
22
18
16
15
13
12
Participating workers with 
primary defined-benefit 
coverage (%)
87
85
83
81
77
73
67
64
62
62
57
56
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Private Pension Plan Bulletin (1997). Calculations are 
based on Internal Revenue Service Form 5500 reports.
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schedule or a "cliff" rule. Most plans chose the latter, under which 
employees' legal entitlement jumped from zero to 100 percent of for 
mula benefits at 10 years of service. The legal standard for a single- 
employer plan was raised to five-year cliff or seven-year graded vesting 
by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 6 These regulations have contributed to 
a higher vesting rate. Sixty-six percent of active participants were fully 
vested by 1993, compared with 36 percent in 1975 (U.S. Department 
of Labor 1997).
Most covered workers must satisfy age and service minimums 
before they begin to receive benefits. The sole criterion is age in 43 
percent of defined-benefit plans, and among these 65 years is the most 
common standard. The remainder use either a minimum years of ser 
vice plus age (e.g., 85 years) or have both age and service minimums. 
A common combined requirement is age 62 plus 10 years of service. 
Thus, many employees are eligible to retire with full benefits before 
reaching age 65.
Almost all defined benefit plans provide for early retirement with 
reduced benefits. Two-thirds of jparticipants are eligible for a reduced 
benefit at age 55 if they have met service requirements (generally, 10 or 
15 years). Also, a growing number of plans permit retirement before 
age 65 with unreduced benefits. 7
Prior to 1986, over half of defined-benefit plans gave no service 
credit for years that employees worked past age 65. The Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 mandated that most plans continue 
to recognize wage and service accruals after the normal retirement age. 
This legislation reduced the ability of defined-benefit plans to penalize 
workers who delay retirement.
While details vary, a common attribute of defined-benefit plans is 
that workers are promised an annuity independent of the level of fund 
ing or pension fund investment performance. The most common for 
mula for determining benefits recognizes years of service and earnings. 
A typical "salary-based" plan would pay a worker reaching the plan's 
normal retirement age an annuity of 1.5 percent of his highest five-year 
average earnings for each year of service. 8 "Pattern" plans, almost 
always found in union settings, deliver a fixed dollar amount per year 
of service.
Two important defined-benefit plan characteristics concern the dis 
tributions of vested benefits to employees who separate before retire-
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ment and the adjustment of benefits after retirement. Pension assets in 
defined-benefit plans generally are "locked in," meaning that vested 
workers who leave the firm do not receive an immediate lump-sum 
payment, but must wait until they meet age and service requirements 
before they begin receiving an annuity. 9 Only 10 percent of workers in 
defined-benefit plans are eligible to receive all benefits as a lump sum. 
Defined-contribution assets, in contrast, are available to 80 percent of 
pre-retirement workers, should they leave the firm (Atkins 1986).
Only a small number of plans formally index annuities to inflation 
after retirement (Alien, Clark, and McDermed 1992). Informal, ad hoc 
inflation adjustments were common during the 1970s, but most pen 
sion recipients bear substantial inflation risk. Alien, Clark, and Sum- 
ner (1986) estimated that while most retirees with defined-benefit 
annuities received an inflation adjustment between 1973 and 1979, the 
average adjustment offset only 40 percent of price level increases.
In defined-contribution plans, benefits are determined by the value 
of the employee's retirement account. Employers make contributions 
on the employee's behalf, based either upon wages, profits, or both. 
The lump-sum or annuity depends upon the market value of contribu 
tions plus interest and dividend earnings. Thus employees bear more 
investment risk under defined-contribution plans (however, see Chapter 
1, note 5). Defined-contribution plans are, by definition, fully funded, 
and the costs to the employer are well defined. Defined-contribution 
benefits are more portable, because of short vesting periods and the 
widespread availability of lump-sum distributions for workers who 
leave before reaching retirement age.
Retkement plans historically were synonymous with defined-benefit 
plans. Defined-contribution plans became prominent as secondary 
coverage, frequently as part of an incentive or profit-sharing plan. But 
defined-benefit pensions have experienced a steady and significant loss 
in market share to defined-contribution plans as the primary coverage; 
the percentage of covered workers whose primary plan was defined- 
benefit fell from 87 percent in 1975 to 56 percent by 1993 (see Table 
2.2). Most of this decline represents a shift towards defined-contribu 
tion plans by plans with fewer than 10 participants. Defined-benefit 
plans remain popular with large employers, and few sponsors of large 
defined-benefit plans have replaced them with defined-contribution 
pensions. 10
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The fastest-growing form of pension coverage is the 401(k) plan. 
Congress passed tax rules for Cash or Deferred Arrangements 
(CODAs) in 1978, which allowed employees to make voluntary, pre 
tax contributions to an employer-sponsored profit-sharing or salary 
reduction plan. In the latter, firms can match employee contributions, 
and 86 percent of 401(k) plans include some matching provision 
(Papke 1995). Matching allows the firm to reward higher-wage work 
ers, since the latter are more likely to contribute (subject to Internal 
Revenue Service [IRS] nondiscrimination rules which require that a 
tax-qualified pension plan not disproportionately favor high-wage 
employees). Another attractive feature of 401 (k) plans is that partici 
pants may be allowed to access the funds before retirement, as with 
drawals or borrowings.
Growth in 401(k) coverage has been dramatic since the IRS issued 
regulations in 1982. Between 1984 and 1993, the number of 401(k) 
plans increased from 17,300 to 154,500, while over the same period 
the number of participants reached 23.1 million. 401(k) coverage 
appears to be primarily supplemental, designed to add to a primary 
defined-benefit or other defined-contribution plan. Only a decade after 
their initiation, however, 401(k) plans provided primary coverage for 
12 percent of the workers who have a pension. 11
PENSION POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
Federal policy has been a major influence on private pensions since 
the first plans were established early in the century. The Internal Reve 
nue Service's basic policy of excluding employer contributions and 
pension fund earnings from current taxable income was adopted 
shortly after the corporate and personal income tax. Payments to fund 
current retirement benefits were recognized as legitimate business 
deductions for corporations. The Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1926 
explicitly exempted the earnings of assets in retirement funds from tax 
ation, and the Revenue Act of 1928 allowed pension sponsors to deduct 
contributions to advance fund benefit accruals. There is evidence that 
favorable tax policy encouraged the growth of pensions, especially
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during the expansion of coverage after World War II (Long and Scott 
1982).
More recently, the trend in federal tax policy has been to tighten 
benefit and contribution ceilings, reducing the preferences accorded 
pension compensation. Contribution limits were established by the 
Revenue Act of 1942, in response to fears that pensions were increas 
ingly being adopted for the primary purpose of avoiding income taxa 
tion. This legislation also established nondiscrimination rules, which 
prohibit adoption of pensions for the primary benefit of high-wage 
employees.
Congress has lowered limits on allowable contributions and benefits 
several times since 1982. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
Act of 1982 (TEFRA) reduced the annual benefit that a defined-benefit 
participant could receive. Benefits paid to defined-benefit participants 
now are limited to the lesser of 100 percent of the highest three-year 
average earnings or $125,000. TEFRA also reduced the maximum 
contribution to defined-contribution plans. These limits were lowered 
further by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 and again in the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986. Allowable contributions to defined-contribution 
plans may not exceed 25 percent of an employee's compensation or 
$30,000.
An overall limit on annual compensation that can be used for benefit 
determinations became effective in 1989. This compensation limit was 
lowered from $235,840 to $150,000 in the 1993 Omnibus Budget Rec 
onciliation Act.
Employer contributions to fund benefits also are limited. The Inter 
nal Revenue Code allows a deduction for the "normal cost" of accrued 
benefits plus amortization of any prior unfunded liabilities. Since 
1987, contributions to plans having assets equal to or above 150 per 
cent of current liabilities are not deductible and are, instead, subject to 
a 10 percent excise tax. The Code further limits the range of actuarial 
assumptions that may be used to calculate pension liabilities. Thus 
sponsors cannot avoid the 150 percent funding limit by adopting a low 
discount rate. Contributions to pension funds determined to be over- 
funded are disallowed. The full funding limit is a controversial rule, as 
critics argue that it prevents many plans from adequately funding 
ongoing (rather than termination) liabilities and eliminates the tax 
shield for many plans (Ippolito 1991b).
Pensions and Productivity 21
The primary motivations for increased taxation of pensions appear 
to be reducing federal budget deficits and the preference of Congress 
for broadening the tax base versus raising marginal income tax rates. 
Some critics have warned that the cumulative effect of reducing pen 
sion tax preferences will be greater complexity and reduced attractive 
ness of pensions, especially defined-benefit plans (Goodfellow and 
Schieber 1993).
PENSION REGULATION
Before 1975, pension regulation was vested in the federal income 
tax code, which established conditions for tax-qualified pension 
plans. The most significant pension regulations were created by The 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The 
expressed goal of ERISA was to ensure that promised pension benefits 
were actually received by retired workers. ERISA created rules for 
vesting, funding, and investing in defined-benefit plans. One of the 
more controversial provisions of ERISA was authorization of the Pen 
sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to administer a mandatory 
federal insurance program for defined-benefit obligations. The PBGC 
is charged with protecting workers' benefits in the event of bankruptcy 
of the sponsor of an underfunded pension plan. Critics of the PBGC 
have argued that premiums are too low and insufficiently experience- 
rated, resulting in incentives for sponsors to terminate underfunded 
plans. They also point out that the PBGC subsidizes a small number of 
plans which are substantially underfunded.
ERISA established vesting rules. The most popular was 10-year 
cliff vesting, subsequently reduced to five years by the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986. Vesting rules address only part of the portability issue. We 
explain in Chapter 3 that even fully vested workers lose substantial 
pension wealth when changing jobs, even if they immediately begin 
earning credits in a new defined-benefit plan. Since 1986 several legis 
lative proposals have addressed this problem but none have been 
enacted (Turner 1993).
Pension portability also is a function of policies that affect the 
choice between defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans. Some
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pension analysts have suggested that policies favorable to defined-con- 
tribution growth were intended by Congress to promote pension porta 
bility (Salisbury 1992). These policies include frequent changes in 
pension rules concerning reporting, vesting, and nondiscrimination, 
which have made administering defined-benefit plans more complex, 
especially for small employers. There is evidence that the price of 
administering defined-benefit plans relative to defined-contribution 
pensions has risen, especially for small firms (Hay/Huggins 1990). At 
the same time, tax preferences for defined-benefit plans have been 
reduced. 12 Another policy change that has been unfavorable to defined- 
benefit coverage is the liberalization of tax rules for CODAs. As we 
have noted, 401(k) plans have been well received.
Falling defined-benefit coverage has attracted considerable attention 
and concern. Some policymakers fear that growing defined-contribu 
tion coverage will lower retirement income. Savings rates in typical 
defined-contribution plans may be lower than in defined-benefit plans. 
Also, participants frequently are required to direct their own invest 
ments, and evidence suggests that workers choose low-risk, but low- 
return, portfolios. The most significant concern is that workers gener 
ally receive a lump-sum distribution when leaving a defined-contribu 
tion plan, and despite recent increases in penalties for failure to roll 
over into an IRA or a new pension, there is significant preretirement 
consumption of these assets. 13
In terms of this study, the major issue raised by the trend to defined- 
contribution coverage for this study is its implications for the use of 
defined-benefit pensions as a tool to increase workforce productivity. 
Does the growing choice of defined-contribution plans imply that pro 
ductivity effects are of second-order importance? We address this 
question in Chapter 5.
NOTES
1. Readers interested in more detail can consult Ippolito (1986), Clark and 
McDermed (1990), or Turner and Beller (1992).
2. As pointed out by Williamson, the view of older workers as more accident-prone 
turned out to be erroneous.
3. Hannah (1986) reaches a similar conclusion for early pension growth in Great 
Britain.
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4. Apparently, DuPont management also believed that workers would accept lower 
wages in exchange for the promise of future benefits, thus reducing the cost of the 
program.
5. See Doescher (1994) or Parsons (1994).
6. Multiemployer plans may continue to use 10-year vesting for employees covered 
by collective bargaining agreements.
7. "Unreduced" means that the retiree will be eligible for benefits as defined by the 
benefit formula given that individual's years of service and final average earnings. 
Of course, the benefit would rise by delaying retirement until age 65 through 
increased years of service, and perhaps, rising nominal earnings.
8. The "generosity parameter" commonly ranges between 1.25 and 1.75 percent for 
each year of service (U.S. Department of Labor 1996).
9. An exception is employees who have a small vested benefit. Defined-benefit 
sponsors may unilaterally cash out employees having vested benefits of less than 
$3,500.
10. See Silverman and Yakoboski (1994). It should also be noted that the trend away 
from defined-benefit plans has been much less apparent in Canada. Defined-bene 
fit plans were the primary coverage vehicle for 90 percent of covered workers in 
1992 (Statistics Canada 1994).
11. See Papke, Petersen, and Poterba (1993) for detailed analysis of 401(k) coverage 
and trends.
12. Clark and McDermed (1990) ascribe most of the shift towards defined-contribu- 
tion plans to changes in pension policy. Gustman and Steinmeier (1992), on the 
other hand, argue that the dominant factor has been structural changes—the rela 
tive decline in traditionally strong defined-benefit sectors of large, unionized, and 
manufacturing employment.
13. Samwick and Skinner (1994), however, estimate that the typical defined-contribu- 
tion plan will yield comparable median income compared with defined-benefit 
plans. They estimate that portability losses from the latter are of similar magni 
tude to asset reductions resulting from spending lump-sum distributions.

3 Pension Incentives
This chapter describes the nature and source of pension incentives. 
It is well known that defined-benefit pensions establish penalties for 
early separation and late retirement. This observation is itself an argu 
ment for the productivity theory of pensions, because workers' ability 
to respond to favorable job opportunities and to continue working past 
the normal retirement age are valuable career options which workers 
would not freely forego. Pension separation penalties also add to the 
risk associated with an involuntary layoff. It follows that these penal 
ties would be accepted by workers in a voluntary employment contract 
only if they supported productivity gains at least sufficient to allow the 
firm to fund a wage premium that compensated for constraints on 
workers' career choices.
A knowledge of pension institutions and the resulting structure of 
incentives is needed to evaluate whether the productivity theory makes 
economic sense. The information in this chapter also should allow the 
reader to understand how legislation would enhance pension benefit 
portability. Most of the discussion relates to defined-benefit plans. 
Arguments that defined-contribution plans, including the rapidly grow 
ing 401(k)-type pensions, also may provide productive incentives are 
presented in Chapter 4.
THE PENSION QUIT PENALTY
Pension tenure incentives frequently are attributed to delayed vest 
ing. 1 Before ERISA, defined-benefit plans often made no provision for 
vesting before retirement. An important part of the legislative history 
of ERISA are infamous cases in which long-tenured workers were dis 
missed just prior to retirement and lost all pension wealth. 2 Except for 
the years just preceding retirement, however, incomplete vesting is a 
minor component of the pension separation penalty. Even workers 
who are "fully vested" stand to lose substantial pension wealth if they 
leave a job before retirement. The pension loss arises primarily
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because most defined-benefit plans 1) calculate benefits relative to the 
worker's peak average earnings, and 2) do not index the earnings of 
workers who leave the plan before they are eligible to receive benefits. 
A specific example will clarify the source of the pension loss.
David and Norman are two identical 45-year-old employees who 
have worked continuously for the past 10 years at Zeke's Zippers, Inc. 
They are fully vested in Zeke's defined-benefit plan. Each draws an 
annual salary of $40,000 and anticipates retiring at the plan's normal 
retirement age of 65. Zeke's plan pays an annuity equal to 1.5 percent 
of the highest three-year average pay times each worker's total years of 
service. David and Norman each forecast that the nominal interest rate 
and wage growth will continue at the current rate of 6 percent.
Suppose that Norman, for reasons outside his control, resigns from 
his job and moves across the country. Norman is vested, so Zeke's is 
obligated to pay him the full annuity, based on his earnings and ser 
vice, when Norman reaches age 65.
The annual pension payment is Norman's highest three-year average 
salary ($37,779, based upon 6 percent nominal wage growth the previ 
ous two years) times 1.5 percent times 10 years of service:
$37,779 x 0.015 x 10 = $5,667.
The annual annuity of $5,667 can be converted to a lump-sum value of 
$62,335 by multiplying by a present-value annuity factor of 11. 3
Fortunately, Norman immediately finds a new job with Fritz' Brick- 
less Fireplaces at his previous wage and with identical pension cover 
age. Assuming continuous employment with Fritz' through retirement 
(20 more years) and maintaining the salary growth assumption of 6 
percent, Norman will be entitled to an additional pension valued at
($125,221 x 0.015 x 20) x 11 = $413,229.
The sum of his pension wealth from both employers at age 65 will be 
$475,564.
David, in contrast, works continuously at Zeke's through age 65. He 
receives
($125,221 x 0.015 x 30) x 11 = $619,844.
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The pension quit penalty is the difference between David's and Nor 
man's pension wealth. At a nominal interest rate of 6 percent, the 
present value of the penalty is
($619,844 - $475,564)e-°-06<2°) = $43,456.
The defined-benefit plan thus establishes a quit penalty equal to 1.09 
times each worker's current annual salary, at their current age and ser 
vice level.4
This example clarifies that the source of the pension loss from a quit 
is not incomplete vesting, a lapse in coverage, or lower earnings at the 
new job—though these would add to Norman's loss. The penalty 
arises because his first 10 years of service is weighted by his final aver 
age earnings with Zeke's ($37,779), whereas David's entire 30 years of 
service is weighted by the considerably larger average preretirement 
earnings ($125,221). Norman's pension from Zeke's is fully vested, 
but the benefit formula does not index the earnings base. Note that had 
Norman not been vested in Zeke's pension, he would have received 
only the pension from Fritz, and his loss would have been larger by 
($62,335)e-° 06<20> = $18,775, less than half the loss that arises from 
inflation of the earnings base.
Once a worker achieves full vesting, the pension penalty requires an 
expectation of nominal wage growth. If nominal wages were fixed, 
Norman's pension loss would be zero. Neither would there be a pen 
alty if service credits were portable, i.e., if Fritz' plan was required to 
transfer Norman's 10 years of service credit to its own plan. In fact, 
defined-benefit plans almost never index the wage base or accept ser 
vice credit from previous jobs. Thus, the thrust of policy proposals to 
enhance pension benefit portability is to require indexing or to estab 
lish clearinghouses for service credit (Turner 1993).
An important property of the pension quit penalty is its concavity 
relative to years of service. The curve is concave-down because an 
early quit allows most years of service to be weighted to the higher 
earnings on the subsequent job, while for a late quit there is little nom 
inal wage growth before retirement. After five years of service with 
Zeke, Norman's three-year highest annual salary would have been 
$27,941, assuming continuous wage growth of 6 percent. Had Norman
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taken the new job then, his total pension would have had a value at 
retirement of
[($27,941 x 0.015 x 5) x 11] + [($125,221 x 0.015 x 25) x 11] 
= $539,588.
The present value of the pension loss would have been 
($619,844 - $539,588)e-° 06(25>= $17,908,
or about 60 percent of current earnings. 5 Under the same assumptions, 
a quit three years from retirement at age 62, after 27 years with Zeke, 
would yield a pension loss of 69 percent of the current wage. At the 
extremes, the quit penalty is zero, both before the first year of service is 
completed and at the retirement age.
The potential pension loss has been called "backloading," because 
vested benefits accrue disproportionately in the years just prior to 
retirement. It also has been likened to an option, because the worker 
who leaves a pension plan early forfeits the opportunity to add to the 
value of his or her pension (Lazear and Moore 1988).
More generally, the pension loss (PL) is the difference between the 
present value of the pension based upon current earnings and the pro 
jected earnings at retirement:
PL = (WRgs - Wsgs)e~*R - s\
where Ws and WR are current and retirement average earnings, respec 
tively; s and R are current and retirement years of service, respectively; 
g is the pension benefit generosity parameter (0.015 in our example); / 
is the nominal interest rate; and R - s equals the number of years until 
retirement.
Assuming that current wages grow at a constant annual rate q, earn 
ings at retirement equals Wseq(R ~ s\ Ippolito (1985) shows that making 
this substitution for WR , the ratio of pension loss to current earnings 
can be written as
PL/WS =
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This equation identifies nominal wage growth as the source of the pen 
sion loss. If q = 0, then PL/WS = 0, because a quitting worker's current 
earnings will equal projected earnings at retirement. Also, the pension 
loss is zero when s = 0 or when s = R.
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 report calculations of the pension loss per 
dollar of current earnings relative to years of service, nominal wage 
growth, and the interest rate (assuming immediate vesting). A con 
cave-down career pension loss profile is apparent. When nominal 
wage growth and the interest rate each are 6 percent, the loss peaks 
after 18 years of service at $1.52 per dollar of annual current cash 
wages. A higher discount rate lowers the present value of all pension 
benefits for the same level of nominal wage growth, and the pension 
loss is lower at each year of service. At an interest rate of 10 percent, 
the loss peaks at $0.88 per dollar of annual earnings. 6
Table 3.1 also shows that the separation penalty is greater when 
higher inflation raises both the nominal rate of interest and wage 
growth. When each of the latter is 10 percent, the pension loss reaches 
a maximum of $1.81 per dollar of current annual earnings at 18 years 
of service. The higher loss reflects the underlying reason for the pen 
sion loss: the interaction of nominal wage growth and an unindexed 
wage base.
The basic pattern of the quit penalty is not dependent upon the 
worker joining a firm at any specific age, although not surprisingly, the 
pension loss is smaller for the worker who begins accumulating service 
credits at age 45 (Table 3.2, Figure 3.2). The employee who begins a 
job at age 25, on the other hand (Table 3.3, Figure 3.3), faces a larger 
pension loss at any given age than workers with less tenure. Regard 
less of the starting age, the pension loss is concave-down in service and 
a positive function of nominal wage growth.
Two other simplifying assumptions are constant nominal wage 
growth and retirement at age 65. The combined effect of these 
assumptions produces a significant pension loss for workers who quit 
or are terminated in their early sixties. If, as evidence suggests, wage 
growth typically slows, older workers' pension loss will be lower. 7 
Almost all defined-benefit plans allow workers to begin receiving ben 
efits at least by age 62. When workers are immediately eligible to draw 
actuarially equivalent benefits, there is no pension loss. Thus the esti-
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Table 3.1 Pension Quit Penalty8
(per Dollar of Annual Cash Earnings, Starting Age=35)
Age
35
38
41
44
47
50
53
56
59
62
65
Years of 
service
0
3
6
9
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
1=6% 
q=6%
$0
0.397
0.755
1.064
1.308
1.469
1.524
1.446
1.197
0.734
0
i=10% 
q=6%
$0
0.117
0.253
0.401
0.556
0.705
0.824
0.881
0.823
0.569
0
i=10% 
0=10%
$0
0.403
0.787
1.139
1.445
1.681
1.814
1.797
1.564
1.009
0
aThe figures in this table assume a pension generosity parameter of 1.5 percent per year of service, 
retirement at age 65, 15 years in retirement, and cost-of-living adjustments during retirement to 
offset half the rate of inflation. Thus when the nominal interest rate is 6 percent (inflation pre 
mium of 4 percent), the discount rate for converting the retirement annuity into a lump-sum equiv 
alent is 4 percent. When the nominal interest rate is 10 percent, the discount rate is 6 percent.
Figure 3.1 Pension Quit Penalty, Age 35 Start
10 15 
Years of service
20 25 30
q=i=6% q = 6%, / = 10% q = i= 10%
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Table 3.2 Pension Quit Penalty3
(per Dollar of Annual Cash Earnings, Starting Age=45)
Age
45
48
51
54
57
60
63
65
Years of 
Service
0
3
6
9
12
15
18
20
1=6% 
q=6%
$0
0.317
0.563
0.717
0.755
0.641
0.336
0
£=10% 
9=6%
$0
0.139
0.279
0.404
0.479
0.525
0.271
0
/=10% 
9=10%
$0
0.354
0.652
0.866
0.953
0.851
0.470
0
aSee footnote to Table 3.1.
Figure 3.2 Pension Quit Penalty, Age 45 Start
8 10 12
Years of service
14 16 18 20
q=i= 6% q = 6%, i = 10% q = i = 10%
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Table 3.3 Pension Quit Penalty3
(per Dollar of Annual Cash Earnings, Starting Age=25)
Age
25
28
31
34
37
40
43
46
49
52
55
58
61
64
65
Years of 
Service
0
3
6
9
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
33
36
39
40
/=6% 
q=6%
$0
0.441
0.861
1.254
1.611
1.923
2.177
2.357
2.444
2.413
2.333
1.867
1.267
0.375
0
/=10% 
q=6%
$0
0.087
0.193
0.317
0.460
0.618
0.789
0.963
1.127
1.253
1.308
1.233
0.944
0.315
0
*=10% 
(7=10%
$0
0.422
0.836
1.239
1.626
1.985
2.308
2.576
2.762
2.833
2.735
2.396
1.711
0.535
0
aSee footnote to Table 3.1.
Figure 3.3 Pension Quit Penalty, Age 25 Start
2.5
10 15 20 25 
Years of service
30 35 40
q = 6%, i = 10% q = i= 10%
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mates in Tables 3.1-3.3 probably overstate the potential losses of pre 
retirement age employees.
RETIREMENT INCENTIVES
In a world in which productivity was easily observed and wages 
were perfectly flexible, firms would not need a retirement policy. 
When and if an employee's productivity declined below the opportu 
nity cost of his or her time, the falling wage would create the appropri 
ate incentive for voluntary retirement. But if the internal labor market 
includes an understanding that the wages of senior employees will not 
be cut, explicit retirement incentives are needed. Resistance to wage 
cuts may result from implied agreements to discourage shirking 
(Becker and Stigler 1974), or to shift the risk of falling productivity to 
the employer. Legislation prohibiting age discrimination also may dis 
courage wage cuts for older workers; however, firms seemed reluctant 
to cut senior employees' wages well before the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) was enacted in 1967.
Many companies employed mandatory retirement rules in prefer 
ence to cutting the wages of older workers. With the abolition of man 
datory retirement by the 1978 amendments to ADEA, voluntary 
retirement incentives became more important (Mutschler 1996). 
Establishing a retirement policy is frequently identified by human 
resource managers as the primary supply-side function for pensions.
The fundamental reason why defined-benefit pensions encourage 
early retirement is that they provide annuities based upon service and 
earnings, independent of the value of the pension fund. When the 
worker is eligible to receive benefits, the accrual in pension value 
resulting from an additional year of work declines because the annuity 
is drawn one less year. In fact, additional years of service beyond age 
65 generally will lower the present value of benefits. The latter effect 
was more pronounced prior to 1986, when most pension plans froze 
service credit and earnings at age 65. At that time, postponing retire 
ment beyond 65 would not increase annual benefits; it only would 
reduce the time that benefits were received. Plans now must credit 
additional years of service and recognize wage increases after age 65.
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The present value of expected benefits still declines for most workers 
after normal retirement, however, because few plans provide an actuar 
ial adjustment of benefits upward to reflect fewer years of receipt.
Defined-contribution plans, in contrast, deliver benefits equal to the 
value of pension fund earnings and contributions. By their nature, the 
present value of defined-contribution benefits is independent of the age 
of retirement once the age of eligibility is reached.
There is no inherent reason why defined-benefit plans must reward 
early retirement. Pension wealth could be made neutral with respect to 
the retirement age by adjusting benefits upward for workers who delay 
retirement, just as most plans make a downward actuarial adjustment 
for early retirement. The U.S. Department of Labor's Employee Bene 
fits Survey (1996) indicates that less than 10 percent of defined-benefit 
plans grant increased benefits to workers who postpone retirement.
Defined-benefit plans also may encourage workers to leave before 
the plan's normal retirement age. The Employee Benefits Survey 
reports that virtually all defined-benefit pensions have provisions for 
early retirement. While benefits are reduced for workers electing early 
retirement, the value of the defined-benefit pension commonly is maxi 
mized by drawing benefits as soon as eligible. Kotlikoff and Wise 
(1987) and Lazear (1983) reviewed a large sample of plans and con 
cluded that the expected present value of pensions benefits generally 
peaked at the earliest age of benefit eligibility.
Other studies have indicated, instead, that the pension value is con 
stant between early and normal retirement ages, especially for plans 
which base benefits on highest average earnings (Fields and Mitchell 
1984). The wage growth assumption is crucial. If older workers antic 
ipate flat or declining nominal earnings between the ages of 62 and 65, 
the value of the pension generally will be maximized by early retire 
ment. Either way, the annual pension accrual drops once the age of 
early retirement is reached, establishing, in effect, a total compensation 
cut for continued work.
Defined-benefit pensions also are well-suited to special early retire 
ment buyouts. The Employee Benefits Survey reported that 25 to 40 
percent of defined-benefit plans contained provisions allowing workers 
who do not meet regular age and service requirements to begin draw 
ing vested pension benefits immediately in the event of a plant closing. 
A survey by Doescher and Dorsey (1992) found that older workers in a
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plant closing or "downsizing" generally received an ad hoc pension 
bonus in the form of additional years of service credit or the right to 
begin drawing vested benefits immediately. Luzadis and Mitchell 
(1991) reported an increasing trend toward early retirement incentives 
in defined-benefit plans and found evidence consistent with the theory 
that defined-benefit pensions are used to establish "buyouts" for older 
employees. Defined-benefit pensions, in effect, provide severance pay 
for older displaced workers.
Could employers establish retirement incentives with defined-con- 
tribution plans or even nonpension cash bonuses? Of course, but there 
appear to be two reasons why employers prefer defined-benefit retire 
ment incentives. First, such incentives are automatic and inherent 
attributes of the way retirement benefits are delivered under defined- 
benefit plans. Plan sponsors must incorporate an actuarial upward ben 
efit adjustment in order to prevent defined-benefit plans from penaliz 
ing older workers. Defined-contribution plans, in contrast, are 
retirement-age neutral. Firms with these pensions would have to levy 
explicit penalties on older workers, which would risk being seen as dis 
criminatory. Rather than fine older workers who fail to retire, employ 
ers could establish a declining schedule of retirement bonuses, but 
discriminatory interpretations of such an explicit schedule clearly are 
possible.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the after-tax cost of estab 
lishing retirement incentives is lower under a defined-benefit plan. 
Contributions to fund early retirement obligations are considered part 
of the normal cost of the defined-benefit plan and are deductible under 
Internal Revenue Service rules. Cash bonuses, on the other hand, 
would be in effect deferred wages and contributions to fund these 
would not be deductible. In order to meet these obligations, the firm 
would have to save outside of the pension fund, earning a lower net 
rate of return.
SUMMARY
Defined-benefit pension incentives for continuous tenure and early 
retirement create a window of time during which a job separation max-
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imizes the value of pension benefits. An earlier separation lowers pen 
sion wealth because the earnings base is not indexed and service 
credits are not generally portable. These portability losses occur even 
for fully vested workers. There is a penalty for leaving the firm too late 
as well, because defined-benefit pension wealth is a function of the size 
of an annuity and the length of time it is received rather than of the cap 
ital value of a pension fund. Employers provide early retirement 
incentives by not making the appropriate actuarial adjustments that 
would make the pension value independent the age of retirement. 
Most plans reduce benefits for early retirement, but they almost never 
apply an upward adjustment for late retirement. Early retirement 
incentives outside of defined-benefit plans are awkward, tax-disadvan- 
taged, and may be seen as discriminatory.
Incentives for long tenure or early retirement could be avoided 
should more neutral plans be preferred. Defined-contribution plans 
which access tax benefits are, of course, an option favored by most 
sponsors, but defined-benefit plans could include rules that temper or 
eliminate tenure and retirement incentives. Given these alternatives, it 
is worth considering that defined-benefit career incentives might be 
grounded in productivity gains. In the following chapter, we consider 
whether pension incentives make sense within the most common inter 
nal labor market models.
NOTES
1. For example, Blinder (1982) developed a model of specific training in which the 
firm uses a pension to discourage quits until it fully recoups its investment, when 
workers become fully vested. Carmichael (1989) recognized pensions as a tool to 
establish self-enforcing implicit employment contracts but suggested that early 
vesting regulations reduced its effectiveness for this purpose.
2. See the summary of Senate testimony on ERISA in (U.S. Senate 1976).
3. This factor assumes 15 years of retirement and a discount rate of 4 percent. The lat 
ter is based upon a real interest rate of 2 percent, an inflation premium of 4 percent, 
and the assumption that the retirement annuity will be adjusted to offset half of the 
assumed inflation rate, as suggested by Alien, Clark, and Sumner (1986).
4. The quit penalty is smaller if we assume no postretirement indexing of benefits, 
because the value of all pensions will be lower. Without indexing, the appropriate 
discount rate for valuing the pension annuity will be the nominal rate of 6 percent, 
resulting in an annuity factor of 9.7, and the pension loss will be 12 percent smaller 
than under our original assumption of 50 percent postretirement inflation indexing.
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5. If he were not vested after five years, his loss would have been higher by $5,143. 
Again, lack of vesting plays a small part in establishing the quit penalty.
6. A higher discount rate lowers pension wealth and losses for two reasons. The 
present value of the lump-sum equivalent is less, but also since we have assumed 
imperfect inflation indexing of retirement annuities, higher nominal interest rates 
reduce the value of the annuity at retirement.
7. Of course, the assumption that the worker immediately finds another job with equiv 
alent wages and pension benefits is less realistic for older workers, especially for 
those who experience an involuntary layoff. However, these losses should be attrib 
uted to whatever factors are responsible for reduced employment opportunities for 
older workers, not the pension plan on a previous job. Most older displaced work 
ers, in addition, received special pension rights which offset or eliminate pension 
losses from an involuntary separation (Doescher and Dorsey 1992).

4 Pension Incentives 
and Internal Labor Markets
Much of the empirical literature on private pensions has centered on 
testing whether workers respond to tenure and retirement incentives. 
The evidence generally suggests that they do. Workers who are cov 
ered by a pension are less likely to quit, and retirement decisions are 
sensitive to differences in pension values. 1 While it seems that workers 
rationally respond to pension incentives, there is considerably less evi 
dence on the question of why firms put such inducements into place.
The remainder of this monograph addresses the economic function 
of pension incentives. The productivity perspective is motivated by the 
recognition that constraints on quit and retirement choices are costly to 
workers and thus must be justified by other benefits. Internal labor 
market models assume that workers are more productive in long-term 
employment relationships. Incentives are needed to preserve job-spe 
cific rents and to signal the appropriate time to retire when the match is 
no longer productive. Pensions can be a vehicle both for penalizing 
quits and for delivering severance payments at the appropriate retire 
ment age.
In this chapter, we ask whether the incentives described in the pre 
ceding chapter are consistent with models in which durable firm- 
employee relationships generate productivity gains. Labor economists 
are familiar with the idea that pension incentives may provide benefits 
in the form of reduced turnover and early retirement,2 but there has not 
been a detailed comparison of pension incentives and the incentives 
implied by internal labor market models. This chapter reviews these 
models and considers whether pension incentives are consistent. An 
important question is, Why do firms sponsor pensions over other incen 
tive schemes such as deferred wages? We also consider a self-selection 
model in which defined-contribution pensions can attract more produc 
tive employees.
Our analysis suggests a plausible case for pension incentives in jobs 
where firm-specific investments or reduced shirking raise productivity. 
Defined-benefit pensions, however, are not the ideal incentive. The
39
40 Pension Incentives and Internal Labor Markets
separation penalty may be too weak to preserve a productive match, 
while at other times it may discourage a worker from leaving for a bet 
ter match.
THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS 
AND PENSIONS
Twenty-five years ago, the analysis of labor markets was based pri 
marily on an auction-market perspective, under which wage and 
employment issues were studied within a contemporaneous demand 
and supply framework. Since then, most important insights into 
employment, unemployment, and wage determination have been gen 
erated from an implicit-contract framework. In the latter, there is a 
presumption of productive long-term relationships between workers 
and firms. When long-term employment yields shared gains, an inter 
nal labor market is said to exist. Recent economic analysis of internal 
labor markets has suggested that many workplace institutions can be 
explained as attempts to achieve efficient outcomes when wages and 
employment are insulated from contemporaneous demand and supply 
shifts or when information about productivity is imperfect.
The internal labor market model naturally raises questions about the 
economic functions of pensions, because establishing appropriate 
incentives is a key problem. Here we consider whether pension incen 
tives are consistent with three variants of the internal labor market: the 
firm-specific training theory, the principal-agent or "shirking" model, 
and an asymmetric information hiring model. Incentives for long ten 
ure are important in each, and retirement bonuses are predicted by the 
first two. The asymmetric information model suggests that defined- 
contribution plans also may provide important useful incentives.
Firm-Specific Training Model
The theory of firm-specific training is one of the most widely 
applied ideas in labor economics. Many jobs involve significant hiring 
costs and require training in production methods that are not transfer 
able to another firm. These fixed costs generate rents that both parties
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benefit from preserving. Firm-specific training supports most implicit 
contract models; Hall (1980) has called it the "glue" that holds workers 
and firms together.
An implication of firm-specific rents is the need for incentives to 
discourage workers from quitting and employers from initiating lay 
offs. Becker (1964) and, more formally, Hall and Lazear (1984) sug 
gested that an efficient compensation policy divides the rent by setting 
the wage between the worker's value of marginal product (VMP) and 
opportunity wage, W°. When VMP > W > W°, each party benefits 
from preserving the job match.
Such a rent-sharing scheme creates other problems, however. The 
quasi-rent creates a bilateral monopoly such that each party has an 
incentive to try to "hold up" the other (Kennan 1979). The worker 
could renegotiate the wage up to VMP, if he or she credibly threatens to 
quit. Similarly, the employer may try to force the wage down to the 
opportunity wage by threatening a layoff. Most significantly, the threat 
of a hold-up will generally preclude wage renegotiation in response to 
shifts in productivity inside and outside the firm when information is 
asymmetric (Flanagan 1984).
Suppose the alternative wage rises above W, but the employee still is 
more productive in the current job (VMP > W° > W). Both parties 
benefit by preserving the job match, but if the employer cannot verify 
the outside offer it will not raise the wage, fearing an opportunistic 
claim by the employee. Similarly, the employee will not be receptive 
to a lower wage in the event productivity at the firm declines. Imper 
fect information and costly contract renegotiation argue for a fixed 
wage to divide the job rent.
A cost of a fixed-wage implicit contract is excessive quits and lay 
offs unless severance taxes or payments can be established. In the lan 
guage of implicit contracts, severance payments are needed to make 
the contract "self-enforcing."
The problems encountered in establishing self-enforcing fixed-wage 
implicit contracts are well documented. 3 Employers must be able to 
make a credible commitment to deliver severance payments to employ 
ees, with the result that they would only benefit from discharging a 
worker whose productivity fell below his or her alternative wage. 
Symmetrically, workers must accept a quit penalty equal to the 
employer's share of the job rent. A penalty equal to VMP - W elimi-
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nates the employee's incentive to attempt a hold-up or to quit unless 
the alternative wage rises above VMP. If the worker must pay the 
employer VMP - W, he or she will quit only if the gain in wages 
exceeds the penalty, i.e., if the wage in the next job exceeds VMP.
In his ground-breaking analysis, Becker (1964) suggested that 
unvested pensions may serve the economic function of insuring firms 
against firm-specific human capital losses when workers quit. Firms 
are more likely to share the costs and benefits of training if it is feasible 
to establish a severance tax to discourage opportunistic wage bargain 
ing or quits.4 That pensions facilitate productivity gains by encourag 
ing workers and firms to invest in firm-specific training has been a 
frequent assumption in research on the economics of pensions. 5
The training model also implies retirement incentives. A down 
ward-inflexible wage establishes a need for severance payments when 
productivity falls. In an auction-market model, where the wage equals 
marginal product continuously, retirement inducements are unneces 
sary. Falling wages provide the appropriate exit signal for retirement 
when productivity declines below the alternative value of workers' 
time. But if the wage is fixed, either to minimize bargaining costs or to 
provide incentives for effort, workers will have an incentive to stay too 
long.
Prior to the legislative abolition of mandatory retirement, many 
employment contracts required workers to resign upon reaching a cer 
tain age. In the absence of these rules, severance payments are needed 
to induce workers to retire voluntarily. 6 Workers will choose to retire if 
offered a payment that compensates for the loss of future rents—the 
difference between their wage and alternative value of time. It will be 
in the interest of firms to offer severance payments when, and if, the 
worker's productivity drops below his or her value of time.
Lazear (1983) formally has modeled defined-benefit retirement 
incentives as severance payments. The economic basis for the contract 
in his analysis is gains from reduced shirking, but severance payments 
are necessary when older workers' wages are rigid downward for any 
reason. Firms may promise not to reduce older workers' wages as part 
of a risk-sharing contract or because asymmetric information makes it 
difficult for employees to verify diminished productivity. More simply, 
legislation prohibiting age discrimination effectively may prohibit 
wage cuts. In each of these cases, pension retirement incentives pro-
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mote efficiency and productivity by encouraging individuals with 
diminished capacity to retire.
The severance pay function of pensions, like the quit penalty, 
encourages investments in workers. In jobs that require training, the 
career productivity profile is more concave due to depreciation of 
skills. Also, wages are more likely to be down ward-inflexible in an 
employment contract where there are firm-specific rents. Thus, early 
retirement inducements should be more common in jobs that require 
investments in firm-specific training.
The Principal-Agent (or Shirking) Model
Another influential internal labor market model is based upon gains 
from increased employee effort. Becker and Stigler (1974) first sug 
gested deferred compensation as a solution to the principal-agent prob 
lem of ensuring that employees deliver the expected quality of work. 
Edward Lazear (1979) extended its implications to an economic theory 
of mandatory retirement. This model assumes high costs of supervis 
ing and monitoring employees. If productivity cannot be easily mea 
sured (unlike, say, for salespersons or stonemasons), the incentive for 
individuals to work hard is diminished. Instead, there is an incentive to 
"shirk," to everyone's mutual loss.
One solution to the principal-agent problem is close employee 
supervision. The costs of monitoring employees may outweigh the 
gains of greater output, however. The Becker-Stigler solution estab 
lishes a long-term employment contract with deferred compensation. 
The firm pays the worker less than the value of his or her output early 
in the career but promises a compensating wage premium to long-ten 
ured employees. Steepening the career wage profile in effect estab 
lishes a bond that is forfeited if the employee is dismissed for shirking. 
Productivity rises through greater effort, and the gains are shared with 
long-tenured workers.
Pensions enter this model in two ways: as a preferred vehicle for 
establishing deferred compensation and to enforce the end of the con 
tract when mandatory retirement rules are forbidden. Significant tax 
advantages apply when compensation is deferred through a defined- 
benefit pension. As we have seen, employer contributions to a pension 
fund are not subject to taxation as current profits, and pension divi-
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dends and interest (unlike earnings from a deferred wage fund) are not 
taxed until employees are paid. Also, Ippolito (199la) points out that 
steepening an already up ward-sloping wage profile results in a higher 
lifetime tax burden under a progressive income tax.
Another reason for deferring compensation through a pension is that 
the employer's promise to deliver deferred compensation must be cred 
ible in order to establish an effective incentive. Lazear (1979) argued 
that the cost of reputation damage would discourage employers from 
reneging on the promise of higher wages late in the worker's career. 
We argue that reputation capital will be more effective in preventing 
such opportunistic behavior in a pension contract than in a promise of 
future wage increases. To avoid deferred pension obligations, employ 
ers must systematically fire workers near retirement. But this type of 
opportunistic behavior is more explicit and easier to detect than failing 
to raise real wages at an implicit rate. Empirical evidence indicates 
that the defined-benefit pension promise is credible: workers with pen 
sions are less likely to be discharged than are older workers who are 
uncovered (Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad 1991). 7 Ippolito (199la) 
showed that pensions have a greater effect on increasing job tenure 
than does increasing the steepness of the wage profile.
The deferred compensation solution also requires an incentive to 
keep employees from working too long. Long-tenured workers receive 
substantial rents and, if permitted, will continue working after their 
productivity drops below the value of alternative uses of their time. As 
in the firm-specific training model, severance payments can buy out 
older workers in the absence of mandatory retirement. 8
Asymmetric Information Hiring Model
Ippolito (forthcoming) has argued that pensions could raise worker 
quality and productivity, independent of training or effort incentives, 
by attracting a higher-quality workforce. This model is based upon 
three assumptions. First, there are important differences in workers' 
internal rate of discount. Some are less focused on immediate gratifi 
cation and instead place a greater value on future rewards; others are 
more impatient ("high discounters"). Second, employers prefer to hire 
workers with low discount rates. Workers who have a longer horizon 
possess several desirable attributes: they are absent from work less,
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take better care of capital equipment, and are more willing to invest in 
training and their own reputation to gain future promotions and wage 
increases. Low discounters thus should require less monitoring and be 
more responsive to deferred incentives. The third, and crucial, 
assumption is that the internal discount rate of prospective hires is not 
observable by employers. A solution to this information asymmetry 
has the firm promising deferred compensation at a level sufficient to 
match the opportunity wage of a low discounter. Workers who heavily 
discount the future therefore self-select out of the applicant pool, 
because the high discounter's value of the compensation package is 
below the opportunity wage. Again, pensions are a tax-preferred vehi 
cle for deferring compensation.
Our discussion of pension incentives so far has focused entirely on 
defined-benefit plans, reflecting the apparent neutrality of defined-con- 
tribution plans: early vesting, full portability, and independence of pen 
sion value to the age of retirement. This suggests that defined- 
contribution plans will be chosen by firms that want to provide a tax- 
favored retirement savings vehicle but where productivity gains from 
long tenure are low. But unlike the firm-specific training and shirking 
models, the asymmetric information model implies output gains from 
sponsoring a defined-contribution pension. For purposes of screening 
out high discounters, Ippolito argues that defined-contribution pen 
sions are superior to defined-benefit plans. Either plan defers compen 
sation, but the defined-contribution plan also encourages self- 
correcting quits by high-discount workers who are hired mistakenly.
The advantage of defined-contribution plans is, ironically, their 
portability. A high discounter may mistakenly be offered and accept a 
job with a pension. Such a hiring error would not be surprising, given 
that a high-discount worker will invest less in a job search. He or she 
places little value on contributions to a pension fund and would prefer 
greater current wages. Under a defined-contribution plan, a lump sum 
payout is available to workers who quit early. This incentive encour 
ages high discounters to leave. As we have seen, immediate lump-sum 
payouts are much more common in defined-contribution plans. While 
both plans attract low discounters, the defined-contribution plan is 
more likely to provide an incentive for high discounters who pass 
through the initial screen to quit.
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The authorization and growth of 401 (k) type plans magnifies the 
selection effects of defined-contribution plans. Employees are allowed 
to make pre-tax contributions to 401(k) plans, which employers gener 
ally match up to a limit. The employer match creates, in effect, a wage 
premium targeted at workers who contribute to the limit, i.e., low dis 
counters.
ARE PENSION TENURE INCENTIVES CONSISTENT 
WITH THESE MODELS?
Pension incentives appear, at first glance, to be consistent with 
widely recognized models of productivity gains from long tenure. Fur 
ther analysis is required, however, to determine whether pension career 
incentives are efficient. It is possible that pension quit penalties may 
be too large—that is, greater than the value of the'job match to the 
employer—and thus result in too few quits. At other times, pension 
incentives may be too weak to discourage an unproductive quit. One 
test of the productivity theory of pensions is to compare pension incen 
tives with ideal deferred compensation structures.
The firm-specific training model calls for a separation penalty equal 
to the value of the firm's investment in the employee. This implies that 
the quit penalty should be concave-down in tenure. A well-established 
result is that the optimal profile of the stock of human capital is con 
cave (Ben-Porath 1967). The stock of skills grows initially because a 
high proportion of earnings capacity is devoted to training. Time in 
training declines with tenure, however, and beyond some point depre 
ciation causes the stock of skills to decline. Assuming that the division 
between the firm and employee of the returns to specific investments is 
not dependent upon age or tenure, the capital value of the firm's invest 
ment also is concave-down. The optimal quit penalty thus is roughly 
consistent with the profile of the typical defined-benefit pension quit 
penalty, as shown in Figures 3.1-3.3.
Of course, not all on-the-job training is acquired as gradually as the 
firm-specific training model implies. Survey evidence suggests that 
formal training for many workers is completed within a few years.
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Pensions would be not as well suited to discourage quits of workers 
who receive training in basic skills that are quickly imparted.
In jobs with high initial training outlays but with little ongoing 
investment in skills, the firm's investment peaks early in the worker's 
tenure and the pension quit penalty would be too small to deter all inef 
ficient quits. Pension incentives conform more closely to the optimal 
separation penalty in jobs where training and productivity growth con 
tinue well into the career. Defined-benefit pension incentives are more 
efficient in jobs where training is in large part a matter of acquiring 
experience and judgement, i.e., "learning by doing." Such informal 
and gradual accumulation of skills also is more likely to be firm-spe 
cific.
The defined-benefit separation penalty seems less suited to the prin 
cipal-agent model than to the firm-specific training model. Its princi 
pal weakness applies to deferred-compensation incentives in general. 
Akerlof and Katz (1989) argue that deferred compensation is a poor 
substitute for monitoring because the value of deferred wages is too 
small to deter shirking by new hires. We have seen that the pension 
loss is low for workers with low tenure. Akerlof and Katz do not claim 
that deferred compensation does not discourage shirking. Their cri 
tique does suggest, however, that separation penalties must be com 
bined with an alternative incentive, perhaps an efficiency wage, to 
establish a sufficient penalty for new hires.
PENSION INCENTIVES, PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS, 
AND INFLATION
Even if the defined-benefit pension initially preserves productive job 
matches, an unexpected drop in productivity could cause the quit pen 
alty to become an impediment to efficient quits. Productivity shocks, 
within and outside the firm, may render previously valuable employ 
ment relationships unproductive. As stated by Sherwin Rosen (1985, 
p. 1170), "Not all marriages are made in heaven. Firms go bankrupt, 
demand shifts to other locations, supply shifts to other countries, prod 
ucts become obsolete and relative demands for goods have been known
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to change over time. Contracts call for permanent dissolutions when 
quasi-rents on firm-specific human capital fall to zero."
An inflexible incentive results in too few quits when firm-specific 
rents unexpectedly decline. The ideal penalty declines with productiv 
ity within the firm. If productivity falls below the worker's alternative 
wage, a layoff becomes efficient and the appropriate incentive is a sev 
erance payment. The loss from leaving a job with a defined-benefit 
pension before retirement generally is not conditional, however. One 
might imagine that it would be difficult to write a separation penalty 
conditional on product demand, due to better information held by the 
employer.
A more feasible approach might be to differentiate workers who are 
laid off from voluntary quits. There can be no productive reason for 
levying a severance tax on workers who are laid off; to the contrary, a 
fixed quit penalty would hinder separations initiated by the firm. Pen 
sion rules could waive the separation penalty for workers who are laid 
off by, for example, providing for immediate vesting and indexing of 
the wage base. The full pension loss thus would be felt only by work 
ers who quit.9
A review of pension rules and practices by Doescher and Dorsey 
(1992) found almost no evidence of formal rules that differentiated 
between workers who are laid off and voluntary quits or, more ambi 
tiously, that linked the pension loss to shifts in productivity. These 
findings are consistent with the implicit contract literature, which sug 
gests the difficulty of making the pension loss conditional on the point 
of who initiates the separation. The problem is similar to achieving 
optimal severance payments in fixed-wage contracts. 10 A variable sep 
aration penalty would not be feasible if the employer has better infor 
mation about the employee's productivity. As long as the firm receives 
a rent, it has an incentive to overstate the quitting worker's value, thus 
maximizing the pension transfer. If the worker cannot verify produc 
tivity shifts, the risk of opportunistic behavior renders the variable pen 
alty unfeasible.
Moral hazards also may arise. If the separation penalty were condi 
tional upon a layoff, workers who receive a wage offer above then" cur 
rent wage have an incentive to lower their productivity to induce the 
employer to initiate the separation. Similarly, when productivity 
declines enough to justify a layoff, the firm would benefit from estab-
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lishing such disagreeable work conditions that the employee quits. A 
contract which created such perverse incentives would be in neither 
party's interest. Finally, if the separation penalty is intended to dis 
courage shirking, the contract would have to distinguish between lay 
offs due to changes in market conditions and discharges for "cause." 
Workers dismissed with prejudice must suffer a loss, but this creates an 
incentive for the employer to opportunistically claim that the worker 
was shirking (Lazear 1983). n
Under certain circumstances, however, these informational and 
incentives problems would carry less force. The Doescher and Dorsey 
study reported that older workers who were part of a large layoff or 
plant closing generally received favorable benefit adjustments and sev 
erance payments. Special early retirement benefits, both ad hoc and 
contractual (primarily in union settings), were frequently observed, 
and these reduced or offset pension losses of older workers affected by 
a mass layoff. The pension separation penalty actually is more flexible 
than formal plan rules suggest.
Nevertheless, the pension loss is not fully flexible in the face of pro 
ductivity shifts, especially for workers below age 50. Critics of non 
portable pensions are correct that pensions can impede efficient 
mobility out of firms in declining industries. The "industrial feudal 
ism" perspective, however, ignores the opposite problem: too many 
quits from jobs which contain firm-specific rents without some type of 
separation penalty. If productivity unexpectedly rises or the job match 
is better than expected, the separation penalty is too small. Given 
information problems which prevent first-best, self-enforcing implicit 
contracts, the pension separation penalty may be a compromise 
between preserving the benefits of productive job matches and the cost 
of too little mobility if job rents unexpectedly decline. 12
INFLATION AND PENSION LOSSES
A increase in the rate of inflation also can result in pension losses 
that are too high. The examples in Chapter 3 showed that the pension 
loss is sensitive to the nominal wage inflation rate. Indeed, anticipation 
of growth in wages is the source of the separation penalty. But neither
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the job training nor the principal-agent model calls for greater real sep 
aration penalties when inflation escalates. The real value of the firm's 
investment in workers, as well as the optimal shirking penalty, should 
be independent of inflation.
Why is the pension quit penalty sensitive to inflation? Ippolito 
(1986) notes that Internal Revenue Service rules explicitly prohibit the 
skewing of pension benefits to senior employees. Tying benefits to 
earnings may be the only way to backload benefits in a tax-qualified 
plan.
This second-best solution would seem to work best under an expec 
tation of stable inflation rates. Quit penalties that were appropriate for 
workers who joined firms during the 1950s and early 1960s would 
have been excessive during the 1970s. Of course, firms could have 
reacted to higher and more variable inflation by adding rules that 
would have partially indexed the wage base for employees who sepa 
rated before they were eligible to receive benefits. This would have 
prevented an increase in portability losses when inflation rose above 
some threshold level. The puzzle is why partial indexing features did 
not appear during the period of more volatile inflation.
SUMMARY
Defined-benefit pensions clearly convey important career incentives. 
The fundamental issue is whether pension incentives are systematically 
related to productivity gains from durable employment relationships. 
This chapter has reviewed the most widely cited long-term employ 
ment models and considered whether pensions incentives make sense 
within these frameworks. We find that pension tenure incentives for 
long tenure are consistent with the firm-specific training model, when 
skills accumulate gradually. Defined-benefit pensions also have advan 
tages in creating deferred compensation in the principal-agent model. 
In any scenario where wages are downward-inflexible for older work 
ers, defined-benefit plans can play a important role in establishing sev 
erance payments.
Pension incentives are not the theoretic ideal. The quit penalty may 
be too weak for new hires, especially if training is completed early in
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the job. Others have argued that pension penalties are too large and 
impede efficient job changes when within-firm productivity falls. An 
unexpected rise in inflation also can create excessive quit penalties. In 
these situations, inflexible pension penalties discourage efficient labor 
mobility.
On the other hand, similar problems apply to up-front bonds or 
deferred wages. The implicit-contract literature suggests that it will be 
difficult in general to establish efficient severance taxes and payments. 
Thus, employment arrangements must trade off the gains from long 
tenure against the costs of preserving unproductive job matches if eco 
nomic conditions change.
While most of our discussion has been in terms of defined-benefit 
plans, incentives also can be conveyed by defined-contribution pen 
sions. Any deferred compensation scheme attracts employees with low 
discount rates. But defined-contribution lump-sum payouts also 
encourage high-discount workers who are mistakenly hired to quit, and 
401(k) plans permit wage premiums to be targeted to low discounters.
NOTES
1. Evidence on quits and pensions includes Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993), 
Gustman and Steinmeier (1995), and Even and Macpherson (1996). Empirical 
studies of pension incentives and retirement are found in Fields and Mitchell 
(1984) and Stock and Wise (1990).
2. However, economists also are quick to point out that incentives to discourage quits 
may be an impediment to efficient labor mobility: for example, Ross (1958), Cho- 
ate and Linger (1986), and Ehrenberg and Smith (1997). The implicit assumption 
is that no job-specific rent is present and thus any incentive for long tenure could 
preserve unproductive job matches.
3. See Arnott, Hosios, and Stiglitz (1988) or Ito (1988), for example.
4. Much of the literature on self-enforcing contracts focuses on problems arising 
from the difficulty of establishing separation penalties on workers. It is noted that 
up-front cash bonds are not feasible due to imperfect capital markets and are in 
fact seldom observed. The potential role of pensions generally is ignored, how 
ever, beyond reference to Decker's suggestion about the role of unvested pensions. 
For example, Carmichael (1989) notes that while pensions at one time might have 
established feasible quit penalties, legislation reducing the vesting period has 
eliminated this role. However, Chapter 2 makes it clear that even fully vested pen 
sions establish quit penalties.
5. Examples of papers that suggest that pensions are motivated, at least in part, by 
firm-specific training are Rice (1966), Schiller and Weiss (1979), Blinder (1982),
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Long and Scott (1982), Ippolito (199la), Woodbury and Bettinger (1991), and 
Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993).
6. In Japan, mandatory retirement still is widely used to enforce the end of long-term 
employment contracts. However, many Japanese workers continue to work for 
their lifetime employer after mandatory retirement, but at sharply lower wages 
(Turner and Watanabe 1995).
7. Another factor making the pension promise more credible is federal insurance. 
Since 1975, the pension contract has been partially insured by the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation. Mandatory PBGC insurance reduces the likelihood that 
pension benefits would not be received due to firm bankruptcy. This insurance 
does not appear to have made defined-benefit pensions more widespread, however. 
Defined-benefit pensions reached their peak of popularity before the enactment of 
ERISA.
8. Another role for pensions is to discourage shirking by employees who are very 
close to retirement. Since their deferred wage losses from dismissal are small, 
Lazear argues that the threat of lost pension rights could prevent more extreme 
forms of shirking, such as theft. It is unlikely, however, that employers could 
credibly threaten to withhold pension benefits to older workers who did not put 
forth sufficient effort.
9. This would still result in too few quits if productivity falls, but the firm continues 
to earn a quasi-rent on the employee. Some workers could receive a wage offer 
greater than their current productivity but not enough to offset a pension loss that 
reflected a higher value to the job match.
10. See, for example, Holmstrom (1983), Hall and Lazear (1984), Kahn (1985), Ito 
(1988), and Arnott, Hosius, and Stiglitz (1988).
11. The problem of establishing the appropriate separation penalty that establishes 
separation efficiency is essentially the same as that of providing for optimal sever 
ance payments in implicit contracts. The literature suggests that it will in general 
be impossible to achieve first-best severance payments (Ito 1988).
12. While nonportable pensions are criticized for tying workers to jobs, it seems likely 
that quit penalties established by deferred wages or efficiency wages also would 
have to be inflexible. If pensions were required to be perfectly portable, employ 
ers may substitute deferred wage incentives, which also would result in insuffi 
cient mobility out of declining industries.
5 Empirical Evidence 
on Pensions and Productivity
The preceding chapter outlined what we believe is a sound basis for 
arguing that pension incentives can promote higher labor productivity, 
but competing perspectives on pensions emphasize insurance, tax 
avoidance, and other "demand-side" motives. These perspectives and 
the productivity theory of pensions are not mutually exclusive. One 
certainly could believe that the primary purpose of pensions is to 
encourage tax-preferred retirement savings, while recognizing that 
firms also benefit from incentives. Demand-side models have received 
more attention, and some writers go so far as to characterize pension 
tenure incentives as lowering productivity by locking workers into 
their current jobs. The implication of pensions being costly must be 
that the incentives are unintended.
We question whether pension incentives can be both costly and 
unintended. If nonportable retirement benefits discourage workers 
from accepting jobs with higher current wages, it would be in employ 
ers' interests to avoid imposing such costs unless lower mobility was 
valuable. Chapter 3 described how sponsors could write pension rules 
to make benefits independent of tenure. The quit penalty could be 
avoided by indexing the earnings of workers who separate before 
retirement. Alternatively, employers could provide immediate lump- 
sum distributions of vested benefits using a real discount rate.
Indexation of the wage base is almost never observed in private pen 
sions, however, and lump-sum distributions from defined-benefit plans 
are not common (Turner 1993). When lump-sums are provided, they 
are valued using a nominal interest rate, which does not eliminate the 
portability loss due to inflation.
Sponsors also could raise portability by early vesting. Recall from 
Chapter 2 that vesting rates were low before ERISA and subsequent 
regulations. The lack of voluntary early vesting makes sense only if 
employers believed that lower turnover is productive. [ A similar argu 
ment can be made for early retirement incentives. Plan sponsors could 
provide pensions that are actuarially fair for all retirement ages, but
53
54 Empirical Evidence on Pensions and Productivity
this practice seldom is observed. In fact, plan sponsors exhibited a 
preference for stronger retirement incentives until regulations man 
dated crediting service after the normal retirement age.
The persistence of pension backloading, delayed vesting, and early 
retirement bonuses is circumstantial evidence that pensions raise pro 
ductivity.2 But does direct empirical evidence supports the productiv 
ity theory of pensions? The remainder of this monograph addresses 
this question. We begin in this chapter by reviewing previous econo 
metric studies. There are few direct tests of pensions' effect on pro 
ductivity, but several papers provide indirect evidence. This chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the implications of the well-known 
growth in primary coverage by defined-contribution plans. This trend 
raises the question of whether the productivity gains supported by tra 
ditional defined-benefit incentives are no longer important.
DIRECT ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE
Productivity gains frequently are cited by labor economists as a rea 
son for pensions, but there is virtually no direct evidence that pension 
incentives improve employee or firm performance. Gustman and 
Mitchell (1992) cite a familiar culprit: inadequate data. Productivity 
studies long have been hampered by the lack of direct measures of 
employee output or firm productivity, and the endogenous nature of 
pension coverage results in even more stringent data requirements. 
Even longitudinal data may not suffice, because changes in pension 
coverage may be endogenous (see Chapter 7).
Despite these difficulties, Alien and Clark (1987) made a first 
attempt at examining the pension/productivity relationship. The 
authors estimated a productivity equation across three-digit indus 
tries. Value added per worker was regressed against the capital/labor 
ratio, union membership, firm size, average age and schooling, and the 
percentage of industry workers covered by a pension. They found no 
relationship between the extent of pension coverage and productivity 
measures by industry in general. However, more extensive pension 
coverage was associated with higher productivity in industries having 
low union membership, younger age composition, and a lower hiring
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rate. They also found no evidence that differences in pension coverage 
were significantly correlated with productivity growth, return on 
equity, or profit margins. The authors were aware that the estimates 
suffered from the shortcomings discussed above. Their productivity 
data is highly aggregated and they did not attempt to model the endo- 
geneity of pension coverage across industries. Indeed, such a two- 
stage procedure would not have been feasible with available data.
In a paper primarily focused on employment fluctuations and profit 
sharing, Kruse (1991) estimated employment elasticities with respect 
to wages and pension costs. His results also can be viewed as a test of 
the productivity effect of pensions, because higher pension costs 
should reflect more generous pensions and greater incentives. In 
effect, this variable combines compensation costs with a shift parame 
ter for labor quality. If pension-covered workers are more productive, 
the pension cost elasticity should be smaller (less negative) than the 
wage elasticity. In other words, higher pension costs would be offset 
by greater productivity, leading to a smaller drop in employment.
Kruse estimated labor demand functions for a sample of firms taken 
from the CompuStat file matched with Form 5500 pension plan 
reports. Coefficients on the pension variable were generally smaller 
than wage coefficients, but the hypothesis that the elasticities were 
equal could not be rejected. Evidence of equal elasticities implies that 
higher pension costs are not associated with an increase in the produc 
tivity of labor. 3
Compensation Policies and Productivity
The absence of direct econometric evidence on pension incentives 
and worker productivity is understandable in light of the ambitious 
data needs. The human resource literature also has generated no evi 
dence on pensions and productivity. In fact, until recently there have 
been few formal econometric studies of the incentive effects of com 
pensation policies in general, so the lack of direct evidence on pensions 
and productivity must be understood in the larger context of our igno 
rance of the productivity effects of wage premiums, wage ladders, 
merit pay, and bonuses.
Recent research by labor economists and human resource specialists 
has begun to address this deficiency. Most of the initial studies of com-
56 Empirical Evidence on Pensions and Productivity
pensation and productivity came from the finance literature. A com 
prehensive review of the literature by Ehrenberg and Milkovich (1987) 
found a number of studies that reported a positive correlation between 
executive compensation and changes in firm performance, and there 
was a consensus that the adoption of stock options and profit-based 
compensation schemes is associated with positive abnormal stock 
returns. Their review yielded little evidence on the impact of compen 
sation systems for non-executive employees, however. A few studies 
examined the relationship between wage levels and measures of per 
formance such as absenteeism and turnover, but none tested for the 
effects of seniority-based wage structures. Ehrenberg and Milkovich 
concluded that very little could be said about the incentive effects of 
merit pay schemes because of methodological flaws in existing studies. 
They summarized the state of knowledge: "We do not know if a firm's 
pay position relative to its competitors, the number of pay grades it 
offers, pay differentials between these grades, or the profile of employ 
ees in a firm's pay hierarchy have any effect on employee behavior or 
the firm's economic performance" (p. 112).
A notable advance in the pay/productivity literature was a special 
1990 issue of Industrial and Labor Relations Review, "Do Compensa 
tion Policies Matter?" edited by Ronald Ehrenberg. This volume 
included papers that examined the effect of alternative compensation 
systems for non-executive employees. Lawrence Kahn and Peter 
Sherer (1990) estimated a positive and significant correlation between 
the sensitivity of pay to performance and subsequent performance rat 
ings of middle- and upper-level managers. Beth Asch (1990) presented 
evidence that production employees respond to incentives. She found 
that the output of navy recruiters, in terms of the quantity and quality 
of new recruits, varied over the tour of duty to maximize the likelihood 
of winning a prize. Recruiters nearing the end of their tour, with little 
chance of earning a prize, sharply reduced their output.
A Brookings Institution project (Blinder 1990) also presented new 
evidence on productivity and individual incentives. Notably, Mitchell, 
Lewin, and Lawler (1990) presented estimates in that volume that 
workers under incentive pay systems earn significantly higher wages, 
implying that these incentives may induce higher productivity.
In contrast to individual incentive effects, there is considerable evi 
dence that group rewards are associated with productivity gains. Kruse
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(1993) reviewed 26 econometric studies estimated across six nations. 
While each of these studies has statistical and methodological weak 
nesses, 57 percent of the 265 reported regression coefficients on profit- 
sharing variables had positive values statistically different from zero, 
and just 8.7 percent had negative values. Kruse's own results were 
consistent with average productivity gains of 2 to 5 percent. Another 
paper by Kruse (1992) reported weaker evidence in support of produc 
tivity gains resulting from the adoption of Employee Stock Option 
Plans (ESOPs). Kumbhakar and Dunbar (1993), however, estimated 
that ESOPs were associated with gains of approximately 2 percentage 
points per year.
A more recent review concluded that "Econometric evidence over 
whelmingly favors the hypothesis that profit sharing enhances produc 
tivity" (Jones, Kato, and Pliskin 1997). This review finds little 
evidence, however, on how profit sharing enhances productivity. Still 
unknown are to what extent gains are due to greater worker effort, 
reduced absenteeism, or quits; adoption of different technologies; or 
enhanced worker participation.
The literature on compensation policies and productivity still is in 
its infancy. In general, no studies have tested for individual productiv 
ity effects of deferred compensation incentives.
INDIRECT EVIDENCE ON PENSIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY
This section reviews empirical evidence on patterns of pension cov 
erage and the relationship between pension coverage and various labor 
market outcomes. We review and evaluate evidence that pension cov 
erage is associated with higher wages, reduced quits and layoffs, and 
increased worker training, and that pension incentives affect retirement 
decisions. These relationships are indirect tests of the hypothesis that 
pensions raise productivity. While no single piece of indirect evidence 
is conclusive, a consistent pattern of results may be suggestive.
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Pensions and Wages
Empirical studies of pension coverage patterns and the relation 
between pensions and labor market outcomes provide indirect evi 
dence on the pension/productivity relationship. A robust finding that is 
consistent with pension-related productivity gains is the pension wage 
premium. If pensions are merely a vehicle for tax-preferred retirement 
saving, with no implications for employee productivity, there should be 
a trade-off between cash wages and pension compensation. On the 
other hand, if covered workers receive more training, put forth greater 
effort, or are less likely to continue working after then- productivity has 
diminished, some of the resulting productivity gain should result in 
higher wages.4
The trade-off prediction is soundly rejected by the data. Even and 
Macpherson (1990) reported wage premiums of 15 percent for males 
and 13 percent for females, controlling for other characteristics, based 
on the May 1983 Current Population Survey. Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1995) also found significantly higher wages for pension-covered 
workers in the Survey of Income and Program Participation data. 
Alien and Clark (1987) estimated that average hourly earnings would 
be 38 percent higher in industries with 100 percent coverage, relative 
to having no pensions. Mitchell and Pozzebon (1987), using the 1983 
Survey of Consumer Finances, also generally found a positive associa 
tion between pension coverage and wages. Dorsey (1989) found pen 
sion wage premiums ranging from 12 to 29 percent based on wage 
regressions from four widely used data sets. Montgomery, Shaw, and 
Benedict (1992) found a negative pension coefficient; however, the 
coefficient was not always statistically significant and the estimated 
trade-off was less than dollar-for-dollar. 5
The strength and durability of the wage/pension relationship across 
different data sets and empirical procedures supports the view that pen 
sions enhance productivity. A complementary explanation is that the 
pension wage premium is itself an explicit incentive policy. Gustman 
and Steinmeier (1995) argued that pension premium represents an effi 
ciency wage and that the latter is more important than pension back- 
loading in reducing turnover. As discussed in Chapter 4, the pension 
penalty may be insufficient to deter shirking for workers with short ten 
ure and so is coupled with an efficiency wage. This idea also suggests
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that the pension wage premium should fall as tenure grows and pension 
incentives become important. No direct test has been made of this pre 
diction to date.
Do Pension Incentives Influence Turnover and Retirement?
The primary mechanism by which pensions raise productivity in 
both the specific training and monitoring models is by reducing turn 
over and inducing workers to retire earlier than otherwise. Thus an 
important body of indirect evidence is the effect of pension incentives 
on worker tenure and the age of retirement. Do workers actually 
respond to pension incentives?
The evidence that pension incentives affect retirement decisions is 
persuasive. Empirical studies of retirement behavior consistently have 
shown that workers with more generous pensions plans retire earlier 
and that retirement hazard functions fit the age pattern of pension ben 
efit accruals; i.e., workers are more likely to retire when the present 
value of retirement benefits is highest. 6
Empirical evidence on the effect of pensions on turnover is less 
clear. There is a consensus that turnover rates are lower in pension- 
covered jobs. Whether lower turnover is due to the pension tenure 
incentive is not settled, however. A recent study by Alien, Clark, and 
McDermed (1993) suggests that backloading of pension wealth in 
defined-benefit plans has important effects on turnover. Their results, 
based on the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, attribute 40 percent of 
the difference in mobility between workers with and without pensions 
to defined-benefit backloading. The authors also found that the pen 
sion loss had a greater impact on jay offs than quits. Their results also 
indicated selectivity into pension-covered jobs, consistent with the 
view that deferred compensation attracts workers with favorable char 
acteristics.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1995), in contrast, are skeptical that the 
pension capital loss is empirically important. They argue that pension 
tenure incentives are too small to have much impact, especially for 
younger workers. The typical loss in pension value for a quitting 
worker is about $17,000, which can be overcome by a pay gain of only 
about 3 percent per year at a new job over the remaining working life 
of a 35- to 44-year-old.
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Of course, whether a loss of this magnitude is trivial is a matter of 
subjective judgement. Also, we have argued that a pension quit penalty 
that is greater than the value of the firm's investment is inefficient. An 
optimal employment does not deter all quits, only those which result in 
lower productivity. Thus the appropriate pension quit penalty depends 
upon the size of the firm's investment in workers.
Gustman and Steinmeier estimate turnover equations as a function 
of pension backloading but include a measure of current versus market 
alternative wages. They find that pension backloading explains a small 
portion of reduced mobility for covered workers once the control for 
the wage premium is introduced. The authors also estimate that 
defined-contribution plans have negative effects on turnover similar to 
those of defined-benefit pensions, a result confirmed by Even and 
Macpherson (1996). Since there is no capital loss in defined-contribu 
tion plans, this suggests that some other factor associated with pension 
coverage lowers mobility. The Gustman and Steinmeier results sug 
gest that this other factor is an efficiency wage, presumably funded 
through higher productivity.
An explanation consistent with most of the empirical evidence is 
that deferred compensation associated with either type of pension 
attracts so-called "low discounters." We are not qualified to conduct a 
review of the literature of a branch of psychology, but there appears to 
be consensus that persons who are able to delay gratification experi 
ence substantially greater educational and career success. 7 Such indi 
viduals will be preferred by employers seeking long-term employees. 8 
They should receive higher wages and also would have lower quit 
rates. Reduced quits follow if low discounters are more likely to 
receive firm-specific training, are inherently more stable, or if quitting 
a pension-covered job sends a signal that a worker is a high discounter 
(Ippolito, forthcoming).
Pensions and Layoffs
Two studies provide evidence that the pension separation penalty 
reduces employer-initiated separations (layoffs). Alien, Clark, and 
McDermed (1993), using the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, 
found that pensions losses were a relatively greater deterrent to layoffs 
than quits. Similar results were reported by Cornwell, Dorsey, and
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Mehrzad (1991) based upon the National Longitudinal Survey; work 
ers facing average pension losses were about 5 percent less likely to be 
discharged than were uncovered workers. Reduced layoff probability 
is consistent with greater firm-specific training investments. This 
result also may reflect the deterrence of shirking by deferred compen 
sation, as suggested by the principal-agent model, or self-selection of 
workers who are more productive and therefore less likely to forfeit 
deferred compensation due to a discharge.
Firms which provide defined-benefit pensions should try harder to 
avoid permanent layoffs, because they may signal opportunistic behav 
ior to current and future employees. This reputation effect requires a 
productivity gain, however, since firms would not offer defined-benefit 
plans that constrain their ability to initiate layoffs unless there was an 
offsetting benefit.
Are Pension Penalties Flexible?
In the training model, the optimal quit penalty mirrors firm-specific 
productivity. Workers whose output unexpectedly declines should face 
a smaller quit penalty. If°firm-specific productivity rents disappear 
altogether, there should be no incentive for continued tenure, and the 
ideal pension becomes fully portable. The separation penalty should 
be conditional on which party initiates the separation. If the firm ini 
tiates a layoff, no productive function is served by requiring that the 
worker who leaves involuntarily make a severance payment to the firm. 
A conditional pension loss could be created by indexing the preretire 
ment wage of workers who are laid off but freezing the earnings of 
workers who quit. Pensions rules also could allow immediate vesting 
for workers who are laid off. A review of rules in major defined-bene 
fit plans found no evidence that workers who were laid off were treated 
differently than quits (Doescher and Dorsey 1992).
Chapter 4 noted that a flexible separation penalty may not be feasi 
ble due to asymmetric information and moral hazard. Under some 
conditions, however, such incentive problems would be minimal. In 
the case of a plant closing or large layoff, shirking is not an issue, nor is 
there a concern that the firm would try to induce the entire work force 
to quit. Thus, waiving the pension loss in a mass layoff would not 
establish perverse incentives. Doescher and Dorsey found some evi-
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dence that employers attempted to offset pension losses for workers 
who were separated as part of a mass layoff or plant closing. Ad hoc 
early retirement offers are. common under these circumstances.
Pension-covered workers also are more likely to have a formal sev 
erance payment plan, which automatically offsets separation losses. 
While formal severance programs cover less than half of all workers, 
informal severance payments are almost universal in plant closings.
Thus, defined-benefit separation penalties generally are independent 
of whether an employee quit or was discharged, but older workers who 
are part of a large layoff can expect significant benefit adjustments or 
severance payments. Given that workers nearing retirement face the 
largest separation losses, these informal benefits increase the flexibility 
of the separation penalty. Nevertheless, the penalty is not fully condi 
tional on productivity, implying that unexpected declines in productiv 
ity can make the pension an impediment to efficient mobility.
Pensions, Training, and Productivity
Encouraging training investments in workers is one of the channels 
through which pension may promote productivity gains. There was lit 
tle evidence, however, that pension-covered workers are more likely to 
receive training.9 Results from two studies provide some indirect evi 
dence that pensions complement specific training. A paper by Hutch- 
ens (1987) focused on the principal-agent model's prediction that 
deferred compensation and pensions are more likely to be found in 
jobs where monitoring employee effort is more costly. He assumed 
that jobs involving repetitive tasks are less costly to monitor. Estimates 
based on job characteristics from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles 
implied that workers in jobs classified as repetitive had a 9-percentage- 
point lower probability of pension coverage. This result is consistent 
with pensions as a deterrent to shirking, but it also has a training inter 
pretation. Repetitive jobs likely require less training and, indeed, 
Hutchens reports a negative correlation between repetitive jobs and a 
DOT measure of time required to obtain the skills necessary to perform 
the job. More directly, the estimated coefficient on this training mea 
sure in the pension coverage equation is positive and empirically 
important.
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Dorsey (1987) estimated the determinants of firms' decisions to 
sponsor primary defined-benefit versus defined-contribution cover 
age. Based on IRS-Form 5500 data, defined-benefit coverage was sig 
nificantly less likely for firms in construction and in wholesale and 
retail trade, industries generally thought to require less firm-specific 
training relative to manufacturing. Also, firms in industries with high 
concentrations of professionals, managers, and craftsmen were more 
likely to sponsor defined-benefit pensions, and such coverage was 
associated with a lower rate of permanent layoff.
Defined-benefit plans also were more likely in large firms. This 
result is consistent with pensions as a complement to firm-specific 
training, under the Oi (1983) hypothesis that large firms' more rigid 
and formal production technologies necessitate greater investments in 
workers. Several other theories also predict this result. Monitoring 
costs may be greater in large firms, and there are economies of scale in 
administering defined-benefit plans (Mitchell and Andrews 1981). 
Large firms, whose survival probability is greater, also can more credi 
bly promise future pension benefits.
The assumption that training does, in fact, raise productivity is gen 
erally accepted by academics and policymakers (Office of Technology 
Assessment 1990), but there is little direct evidence on the magnitude 
of the productivity gains. Early studies on this topic focused on 
whether wage-tenure profiles are consistent with the firm-specific 
training model. More recent studies generally conclude that training 
raises wages and that wage growth is faster after workers receive train 
ing (Lynch 1992). A few papers have tested the link between training 
and output, including Bishop (1990) and Holzer (1990). Bartel (1994) 
found that firms which support greater training expenditures experi 
enced more rapid increases in productivity, and that training leads to 
higher performance reviews and faster wage growth (Bartel 1995).
THE DECLINE IN DEFINED-BENEFIT COVERAGE
The most important recent development in the pension market is the 
substantial loss of market share of defined-benefit plans. Table 2.2 
showed that the percentage of workers having pensions with primary
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coverage under a defined-benefit plan fell from 87 percent to 57 per 
cent between 1975 and 1992. Beyond the numbers, the changing pat 
tern of pension coverage is suggested by the following quote from 
Edwin C. Hustead, a prominent benefit plan actuary and consultant:
Back then ... there was only one (retirement) plan. If you wanted 
to put in a savings plan, okay, but a defined benefit plan was the 
answer and we helped them choose one and put in that plan . . . 
Since the 1980s, however, employers have been hearing some 
thing like this. 'Well, there are two types of plans, there's a 
defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan ... On the 
defined benefit side, it's going to cost you $10,000 just to put that 
plan in place, and it's going to cost you $5,000 to $10,000 a year 
just to keep it going ... So I would be glad to tell you about 
defined benefit plans, if you really want me to, but you don't want 
one, unless you have unusual circumstances, so let's install a 
defined contribution plan.' (Schmitt [1993], p. 161.)
Mr. Hustead's perception is reinforced by Internal Revenue Service 
records on requests for tax-qualified status for new retirement plans. In 
1981, the IRS issued over 24,000 favorable determination letters for 
new defined-benefit plans and 58,000 for defined-contribution pen 
sions. By 1992, fewer than 500 letters were issued approving new 
defined-benefit plans, compared with 14,000 new defined-contribution 
approvals (EBRI1993).
Falling coverage raises questions about the economic justification 
for defined-benefit plans. Does the growing popularity of defined-con 
tribution pensions imply that incentives for long tenure and early 
retirement are now less important? Has the demand for defined-benefit 
pensions declined because the value of long-term employment has 
diminished? The rapid growth of primary coverage by defined-contri 
bution plans raises basic questions about the supply-side theory of pen 
sions.
We believe that a careful examination of this trend suggests that it is 
largely policy-driven. The evidence does not support the view that the 
move to defined-contribution plans is motivated by the desire of firms 
and workers to avoid defined-benefit incentives. An alternative theory 
is that policy changes raised the relative cost and lowered the relative 
advantages of defined-benefit plans. This caused a shift in favor of 
defined-contribution plans by marginal sponsors, those for whom
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defined-benefit incentives were less valuable. Nevertheless, a large 
group of employees and sponsors continue to participate in defined- 
benefit plans. The latter are more likely to be large firms or in manu 
facturing, which arguably have a greater motivation for pension incen 
tives.
A substantial portion of the growth in defined-contribution coverage 
reflects employment shifts away from sectors with traditionally high 
defined-benefit coverage. Gustman and Steinmeier (1992) estimated 
that at least half of the drop in defined-benefit share can be attributed to 
falling employment shares in large firms, in manufacturing industries, 
and in union membership. Clark and McDermed (1990) attribute a 
smaller, but still significant, share of the decline to employment shifts. 
An important factor in declining defined-benefit coverage is union 
membership. Ippolito (1995) used more recent union membership data 
and concluded that 55 percent of the coverage shift represented 
retrenchment in traditionally strong defined-benefit sectors.
Thus, perhaps half of the movement to defined-contribution plans 
represents a shift in choices. One could argue that this shift is an equil 
ibrating adjustment as managers began to recognize the advantages of 
defined-contribution plans, but it is difficult to explain why it would 
take plan sponsors until the mid 1970s to reach this conclusion. This 
interpretation also leaves unexplained why, during the same time 
frame, the defined-benefit market share in Canada remained relatively 
constant. Between 1982 and 1992, defined-benefit coverage in Canada 
remained above 90 percent (Statistics Canada 1994).
Between 1979 and 1988, the overall percentage of pension-covered 
workers with primary defined-benefit plans fell by 12 percentage 
points. 10 The decline in defined-benefit coverage occurred primarily in 
large firms in manufacturing industries. Table 5.1 disaggregates the 
change in primary defined-benefit coverage by size of employer.' l It 
shows that the growth in defined-contribution coverage was greatest 
among small plans. The percentage of covered workers who had 
defined-benefit coverage fell 15.5 percentage points for firms with 
200-^499 employees, but the decline was only 3.5 points for firms with 
more than 5,000 employees. Note that the share of total pension cover 
age, by either type of plan, accounted for by smaller plans rose, rein 
forcing the overall trend to defined-contribution coverage. Firms with
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Table 5.1 Primary Defined-Benefit Coverage by Firm Size, 1979-1988
Covered workers 
in D-B plans, 1979 
Employees (%)
<200
200-499
500-999
1,000-1,999
2,000-4,999
5,000 +
59.9
62.6
69.9
77.7
81.8
90.0
Change in covered 
workers in D-B plans 
1979-88
(%)
-11.4
-15.5
-11.0
-8.3
-6.8
-3.5
Change in total 
pension share8
(%)
2.4
2.6
1.3
1.3
0.3
-8.1
SOURCE: Ippolito (1995).
aPension share is the percentage of total coverage accounted for by each firm size category.
5,000 or more employees lost 8.1 percentage points of the total pension 
market. 12
Table 5.2 provides additional evidence that the trend to defined-con- 
tribution primary coverage is largely due to small firms. Between 1985 
and 1989, the greatest losses in the number of defined-benefit plans 
and participants were in plans with fewer than 50 participants. The 
percentage of primary coverage plans which were defined-benefit fell 
by 31 points among small sponsors over this period. The decline in 
participants by firm size is similar. Among large plans, the number of 
defined-benefit plans and covered workers remained stable.
Coverage trends also differ by industry. Table 5.3 suggests that 
industries which initially had high defined-benefit coverage were less 
likely to adopt defined-contribution plans. The coverage rate remained 
high in manufacturing, but construction, services, and wholesale trade, 
which were less likely to have defined-benefit coverage initially, expe 
rienced high growth in primary defined-contribution coverage. Again, 
industries with larger declines in defined-benefit coverage also saw 
their share of total pension coverage shrink.
Growth in primary coverage by defined-contribution plans thus 
largely reflects adoptions by small firms and in nonmanufacturing 
industries, coupled with a rising share of total pension coverage in 
these sectors. Arguably, the value of supply-side incentives of defined- 
benefit pensions is less in sectors where defined-contribution coverage
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Table 5.2 Changes in Primary Defined-Benefit Plans and Coverage, 
1985-1989
Participants
2-49
50-249
250-499
500-999
1,000-2,499
2,500-4,999
5,000+
Change 
in plans
(%)
-31.0
-22.6
-13.9
-14.2
-5.9
-1.7
1.6
Change in 
participants
(%)
-29.3
-22.8
-13.4
-14.0
-5.6
0.3
0.2
Distribution of 
participants, 1989
(%)
3.1
6.6
5.2
7.0
12.6
10.8
54.7
SOURCE: EBRI (1993) tabulations from Form 5500 reports.
Table 5.3 Primary Defined-Benefit Coverage By Industry, 1979-1988
Employees
Manufacturing
Transportation
Public admin.
Finance
Mining
Services
Agriculture
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Construction
Pension covered 
workers in D-B 
plans, 1979
(%)
90.7
90.0
86.3
85.5
79.8
79.8
78.8
66.6
64.5
32.3
Change in covered 
workers in D-B 
plans, 1979-88
(%)
-3.5
-3.7
-1.3
-7.2
-4.9
-12.2
-5.9
-9.4
-6.7
-12.7
Change in total 
pension share9
(%)
-3.9
-1.0
0.6
-0.3
0.2
3.8
0.1
0.6
0.6
0.2
SOURCE: Ippolito (1995).
aPension share is the percentage of total coverage accounted for by each firm size category.
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has been growing most rapidly. Training requirements, in general, are 
lower for nonmanufacturing employees. Monitoring costs also should 
be less in small firms, reducing the importance of deferred compensa 
tion arrangements. Defined-benefit among these employers initially 
was lower, consistent with this conjecture (Dorsey 1987). This sug 
gests that the decline in defined-benefit coverage largely has occurred 
at the margin. A number of policy changes have raised the relative cost 
and lowered the benefits of defined-benefit plans.
Federal regulation of defined-benefit pensions expanded signifi 
cantly with the adoption of ERISA in the mid 1970s. Chapter 2 pre 
sented a brief overview of reporting, vesting, funding, and insurance 
standards. Nondiscrimination rules also became increasingly strict and 
complex (Utgoff 1991). These regulations raised administrative costs 
for all pensions, but relatively more for defined-benefit plans. A 
widely cited study for the PBGC by the Hay-Huggins Company (1990) 
estimated that the administration cost per participant rose 180 and 97 
percent for defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans, respec 
tively, between 1981 and 1991. While the ratio of defined-contribution 
to defined-benefit administration costs fell for plans of all size, the 
effect was greater for small plans. Tax preferences were trimmed for 
pension compensation over this period, as well. Again, the greatest 
impact was on defined-benefit plans (EBRI1993). 13
Ippolito (1995) argues that regulatory cost can be only a partial 
explanation, since the administrative cost differential increased signifi 
cantly only for smaller plan sponsors. He calculates that the difference 
in costs grew to 13 percent of the average pension contribution for 
plans with fewer than 15 participants by 1991. However, for the largest 
plans the differential still was less than 1 percent of contributions.
Higher administrative costs help to explain the shift to defined-con 
tribution plans by smaller firms. They cannot explain the more modest 
but important movement to the defined-contribution format by spon 
sors of large plans. Table 5.1 shows that defined-contribution share 
grew among firms with more than 1,000 employees. Ippolito attributes 
most of this trend to the authorization in 1981 of the 401(k) plan. This 
allowed, for the first time, employees to make voluntary, pre-tax contri 
butions to a defined-contribution fund. Employers are permitted to 
match these contributions up to a limit. The 401(k) plan was warmly
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received in the pension market, becoming the primary coverage vehicle 
for 12 percent of covered workers by 1988.
A conjecture is that productive incentives have been a factor in 
401 (k) growth among large firms. Like other pension plans, they 
attract workers who value deferred compensation. We have suggested 
that firms would prefer to hire workers who are able to delay gratifica 
tion, the so-called "low discounters." Defined-contribution plans per 
form this task more efficiently because the availability of lump-sum 
distributions provides an incentive for high discounters to quit. A fur 
ther advantage of 401 (k) pensions is matching, which allows firms to 
pay a compensation premium to workers who make high voluntary 
contributions. Ippolito estimated that 70 percent of the increase in 
preference for 401(k) pensions, between 1979 and 1988, came from 
firms that likely would otherwise have chosen defined-benefit plans.
401(k) plans do not reward long tenure. However, the ability to tar 
get higher compensation to workers who are more forward-looking 
may reduce turnover. We also have heard arguments that providing any 
type of coverage as a type of efficiency wage is a more effective tool 
for discouraging quits than deferred compensation. Evidence that quit 
rates are lower under either type of pension plan suggests that 401(k) 
incentives are a good substitute for deferred compensation.
Defined-contribution plans are at a distinct disadvantage, however, 
at subsidizing early retirement. Anecdotal evidence indicates that 
retirement incentives remain valuable, especially in large firms. The 
growth of 401 (k) coverage seems likely to continue to displace 
defined-benefit coverage, but predicting the ultimate outcome requires 
a better understanding than we now have of the value of early retire 
ment incentives.
We conclude that the trend to defined-contribution pensions is not 
conclusive evidence that defined-benefit incentives have outlived their 
usefulness. Much of the trend reflects employment growth in sectors 
which traditionally have favored the defined-contribution format. 
Changes in coverage rates account for perhaps half of the decline in 
defined-benefit coverage. The latter, which are most evident in small, 
nonmanufacturing firms, likely have been driven by policy changes 
which increased the relative cost of administering and lowered the 
demand for defined-benefit plans. Defined-benefit coverage remains a
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factor in large, manufacturing firms, where the gains from long-term 
employment contracts arguably are greater.
SUMMARY
There is little direct evidence that workers or firms with pensions are 
more productive. Indirect evidence, however, is consistent with a pro 
ductivity role for pensions. In particular, there is robust evidence that 
pension coverage is associated with large wage premiums. Pension- 
covered workers also experience lower quit and layoff rates and are 
more likely to receive training.
While there are clear differences in outcomes between workers in 
jobs that provide pensions and those that do not, the mechanism which 
drives these results is not known. The differences are consistent with a 
separation penalty which discourages shirking or promotes firm-spe 
cific training. But there is evidence that defined-contribution coverage 
also is associated with favorable labor market outcomes. An hypothe 
sis consistent with the latter is that pensions attract workers who are 
inherently more forward-looking and presumably better employees. 
There is little evidence to judge whether and to what extent productiv 
ity gains result from each of these incentive channels.
An argument that defined-benefit incentives enhance productivity 
has been the very fact of their popularity, but the recent surge of pri 
mary defined-contribution coverage calls into question the productivity 
advantages of defined-benefit pensions. Our analysis suggests that the 
trend does not deny the relevance of the productivity theory. Much of 
the movement towards defined-contribution plans reflects structural 
employment shifts or policy changes that caused marginal sponsors to 
switch from defined-benefit plans. Changes in pension coverage were 
much less evident among large, manufacturing establishments, where 
gains from long-term employment likely are greatest.
There are indications that 401(k) plans are substituting for defined- 
benefit plans among large employers. The ability to target wage premi 
ums to forward-looking employees may be a good substitute for 
defined-benefit tenure incentives. If so, the remaining productive
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advantage of traditional defined-benefit plans is early retirement incen 
tives.
NOTES
1. Another theory is that employers preferred delayed vesting to reduce pension 
costs. The longer that workers waited to become vested, the lower the costs of the 
plan due to quits and layoffs. However, this theory suggests that employers were 
getting something for nothing. If workers were aware of the low likelihood of 
receiving benefits, they would place low value on the pension. Employers would 
have to pay higher current wages, then, to provide a competitive compensation 
package.
2. It is possible that retirement incentives are valuable but rewarding long tenure is 
not. Productivity may decline with age, even if there is no firm-specific compo 
nent. However, the human capital model does suggest the possibility that firm- 
specific skills will depreciate and therefore retirement incentives will be more 
valuable in jobs that require training. Retirement incentives also are more likely, if 
deferred compensation deters shirking.
3. The efficiency wage hypothesis also implies that paying higher wages will 
increase labor productivity, implying small employment reductions for firms pay 
ing higher wages. To the extent that the wage elasticity estimated by Kruse mea 
sures this effect, the pension/productivity effect would be understated.
4. Note that some of this rent will in fact be a compensating wage premium to offset 
the cost of reduced mobility and flexibility.
5. It should be noted that single-equation estimates may be biased upward. Pension 
coverage is a choice variable and cannot be treated as exogenous in a wage regres 
sion. The potential for bias arises because an important factor in the pension deci 
sion is taxable income. It may be that the OLS pension coefficients partly reflect a 
greater preference for pension tax incentives by high-wage workers. While no 
published estimates have attempted to estimate the wage-pension trade-off with 
endogenous pension coverage, Dorsey's results (1989) suggested that a strong 
positive correlation between pension coverage and wages remains after control 
ling for selectivity.
6. For example, Fields and Mitchell (1984) and Stock and Wise (1990). Also, see the 
review of retirement models in Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990).
7. A well-publicized experiment involved giving 4-year-olds a choice of a small 
reward (for example, one marshmallow) immediately or a higher reward later. 
Pre-schoolers who were able to delay gratification averaged considerably higher 
SAT scores and were rated higher by parents in the ability to concentrate and cope 
with stress (Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1989).
8. The difference between a low and a high discounter can be illustrated by two 
bumper stickers we recently have seen: "Hard Work Has a Future Payoff. Lazi 
ness Pays Off NOW!" and "Warning: Dates in Calendar Are Closer Than They
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Appear." Essentially, this theory states that employers would prefer to hire people 
whose cars sported the latter.
9. We present new tests of this hypothesis in Chapter 6.
10. The decline in defined-benefit coverage shown in these tables is less than that 
reported for the universe of plans, primarily reflecting the exclusion of plans with 
fewer than 100 participants from the analysis.
11. These estimates are taken from Ippolito's (1995) analysis of IRS Form 5500 
reports for 1979 and 1988.
12. In 1979, 69.7 percent of all workers with pensions were in firms with 5,000 or 
more employees. By 1988, this share had fallen to (69.7 - 8.1) = 61.6 percent.
.13. For example, the 150 percent funding maximum established in 1987, which effec 
tively prohibited sponsors of plans with younger employees to fully fund future 
liabilities at the pre-tax rate of return.
6 Estimates of the 
Pension/Training Relationship
An important conclusion of the previous chapter was that there is lit 
tle formal empirical evidence that pensions promote higher productiv 
ity. The remainder of this monograph presents new empirical results 
on the relationship between pension coverage and productivity. This 
chapter tests one of the channels by which pensions may raise work 
force productivity: by complementing training investments in workers.
No study has tested directly the prediction that employers who pro 
vide training will compensate workers with pensions in order to dis 
courage quits. While there are several studies of the empirical 
determinants of pension coverage, 1 and others which have identified 
factors encouraging the provision of employer-provided training,2 only 
a few have tested the relationship between these two employment out 
comes. Papers by Hutchens (1987) and Dorsey (1987), reviewed in the 
previous chapter, provided indirect evidence of a positive relationship 
between pensions and training. More recently, Johnson (1996) used 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men to find that retirees 
who reported more job training received higher pension income. His 
empirical model, however, was not based upon a model of pension 
career incentives.3
We test for a relationship between pensions and training with two 
data sets: the matched 1991 Current Population Survey (CPS) files and 
the 1992 Health and Retirement Survey. The results are consistent 
with a productivity role for pensions. Controlling for other worker and 
firm characteristics, we estimate a positive and significant correlation 
between pension coverage and training. Workers who receive training 
also are slightly more likely to participate in a defined-benefit plan, 
given that they have a pension.
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THE INCENTIVE MODEL OF PENSIONS AND TRAINING
The specific training model predicts that workers who receive train 
ing also will be provided with incentives to discourage quits. Chapter 
4 presented a view of the pension quit penalty as such a severance tax. 
The training model also predicts that wages will be less flexible down 
ward and that productivity will diminish more sharply as workers age. 
The optimal contract thus includes a severance payment, which also 
may be provided by a defined-benefit pension.
Pensions also attract workers who are more forward-looking. This 
incentive also should encourage training, as persons with low discount 
rates value future wage gains more highly and hence are more willing 
to undergo training investments. The quit penalty and retirement 
incentive suggests that training should be related only to defined-bene 
fit coverage. Self-selection of workers by internal discount rates also is 
achieved by defined-contribution pensions, as we have seen.
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
The hypothesis tested in this chapter is quite straightforward: work 
ers who receive training are more likely to be covered by a pension. Of 
course, each of these variables is an endogenous outcome of worker 
and firm choices. Given its decision to train, employers are more likely 
to include a defined-benefit pension in the compensation package. At 
the same time, the willingness of employees to accept the constraints 
of pension career incentives influences the training decision. Ideally, 
we would estimate a model of jointly determined pension coverage and 
training:
Eq. 6.1 P = P[X,Z,T]
Eq.6.2 T=T[Y,V,P],
where P = a pension coverage dummy variable;
T = a dummy variable indicating training received at the 
workplace;
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X = worker attributes associated with higher demand for 
pension coverage;
Z = firm attributes associated with greater willingness to 
provide pension coverage;
Y = worker attributes associated with greater productivity 
gains from training; and
V - firm attributes associated with greater productivity 
gains from training.
Previous studies separately have estimated equations similar to Eqs. 
6.1 and 6.2, and they have found that both pension coverage and train 
ing likelihood are affected by education, age, gender, job tenure, mari 
tal status, union membership, and wage income. Firm size and 
industry also affect both employment outcomes. Thus the data avail 
able to us preclude identifying restrictions sufficient to estimate struc 
tural parameters from Eqs. 6.1 and 6.2. It is not possible to exclude, a 
priori or empirically, any of the variables in the X and Z vectors from 
either the training or the pension equation.
However, identifying which causal effect is greatest goes beyond 
our more modest goal of testing for pensions and training complemen 
tarity. A finding of zero correlation or a negative correlation between 
these two employment outcomes is sufficient to reject the prediction 
that pension incentives are related to training and, ultimately, to pro 
ductivity gains. Therefore, our basic empirical model is a single-stage 
pension coverage equation, with training variables included among the 
set of regressors. But we emphasize that the coefficient on the training 
variable is a reduced-form estimate of correlation between pension 
coverage and training, controlling for other pension coverage (and 
training) determinants. We do not mean to imply that causation runs 
only from training to pension coverage.
CPS DATA
Until recently, no data set would have allowed a test of even the sim 
ple prediction that pension and training are complements. Most train 
ing surveys did not include pension compensation. The January 1991
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CPS has a detailed job training supplemental questionnaire but no 
information on pension coverage. Fortunately, we were able to use a 
matching procedure to obtain information on respondents' pension sta 
tus from the March CPS. Half of the January rotation groups were sur 
veyed in March, including questions about pension coverage and firm 
size at the main job during 1990. Another match to the March and April 
CPS brought in a union status variable. The completed matched file is 
a sample of more than 11,000 full-time, private-sector employees.
This data set has several advantages. First, coverage is more repre 
sentative of the overall labor force, with all age groups and both sexes 
included. Other training surveys have focused on younger males or 
oversampled low-wage workers (Brown 1990). Second, it includes 
information on employer size, which is an important control for both 
training (Oi 1983) and pension coverage (Mitchell and Andrews 1981). 
Finally, the CPS training* questions provide information on type and 
place of training. Each employed respondent was asked, "Since you 
obtained your present job, did you take any training to improve your 
skills?" To those answering "yes," additional questions were put con 
cerning type of training, including reading, writing, and math skills, 
computer or other technical instruction, or managerial training. They 
also were asked where their training took place—in school, at the com 
pany's training facility, or through informal on-the-job training (OJT). 
These additional prompts allow a test of whether training that is likely 
to be more firm-specific has a stronger correlation with pension cover 
age than general training.
An important drawback is that the pension variable does not distin 
guish between defined-benefit and defined-contribution coverage. We 
addressed this problem analyzing data from the 1992 Health and 
Retirement Survey, which includes information about pension plan 
type as well as a training measure.
We restricted the sample to private-sector, non-self-employed per 
sons, age 20-65, who reported usually working at least 35 hours per 
week. Table 6.1 presents sample means and standard deviations. 
Forty-five percent reported receiving training at their current job, 
including 20.4 percent receiving formal training at the job, 18 percent 
informal OJT, and 12.9 percent training in an outside classroom. 
These figures generally are consistent with estimates from other sur 
veys.4
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Table 6.1 Means and Standard Deviations8
Variable
Training at current job
Training by place
At company, formal classroom
At company, informal OJT
Outside company, classroom
Training by type
Reading, writing, math
Computer-related
Other occupation-specific technical skills
Managerial
Pension
Years of education
Years of tenure
Female
Nonwhite
Age
Married, spouse present
Firm size (no. of employees)
25-99
100-499
500-999
1,000+
Union member
Mean
0.453
0.204
0.180
0.129
0.062
0.161
0.289
0.136
0.548
13.1
7.85
0.434
0.116
38.3
0.641
0.151
0.176
0.710
0.411
0.160
Standard 
deviation
0.498
0.403
0.385
0.336
0.242
0.367
0.453
0.343
0.498
2.56
7.82
0.496
0.320
10.8
0.480
0.358
0.381
0.256
0.492
0.366
aSample size = 1 1,269 observations.
Training also can be decomposed by type. Just 6 percent reported 
training in general skills (reading and mathematics), while 16 percent 
reported computer training. Training in "other occupation-specific 
skills" was received by 29 percent, and 13.6 percent participated in 
programs aimed at developing managerial or supervisory skills. The 
percentage of workers participating in an employer-sponsored pension 
plan was 54.8, which is in the range of other reported CPS coverage 
estimates for full-time, private-sector employees.
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CPS ESTIMATES
Results from probit estimates of several specifications of the pen 
sion coverage equation are reported in Table 6.2. The coefficient on 
the training variable is positive and significant in each model. The pro- 
bit coefficient of 0.427 in column a implies a partial derivative of 
0.169; that is, before controlling for other determinants of pension cov 
erage, workers who report receiving training at their current job are 
16.9 percent more likely to have a pension.
Column b introduces several control variables suggested by theory 
and previous empirical studies of pension coverage. These include age 
and income (Dorsey 1982), gender (Even and Macpherson 1990), firm 
size (Parsons 1992), and union status (Freeman 1985). These studies 
controlled for education, possibly as a proxy for the employee's dis 
count rate, because those who invest more in education demonstrate a 
willingness to defer income. Previous studies have found that married 
workers are more likely to have pension coverage. This result may 
reflect higher marginal tax rates in marriage, or that married workers 
have greater job stability and thus value nonportable pension benefits 
more than workers who have shorter expected tenure.
The coefficient estimates on these controls reported in column b are 
consistent with earlier studies. Annual wage income, education, age, 
employment at a larger firm, being married, and union membership 
each increase the likelihood of having a pension. More importantly, 
even after adding these controls, we estimate that workers with training 
are nearly 7 percent more likely to have a pension.
It is noteworthy that the training coefficient remains positive after 
controlling for annual wage income. Part of the simple correlation 
between pension coverage and training likely reflects preferences for 
tax-preferred pension compensation by higher-wage employees. 
Another hypothesis for the correlation between training and pension 
coverage is offered by Gustman and Steinmeier (1995). They argue 
that pension coverage is part of an efficiency wage package, where the 
latter is more important in reducing quits than pension incentives. 
Both of these ideas are reasons why it is important to include wage 
income in the model. Indeed, when the income variable is excluded, 
the estimated training coefficient is substantially larger (column c).
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Table 6.2 Probit Pension Coverage Estimates9
Variable
Intercept
TRAINING AT
CURRENT JOB
EDUCATION
MARRIED, SPOUSE
PRESENT
AGE
AGE SQUARED
FEMALE
a b
-0.069 -4.326
(4.32) (22.83)
0.427 0.170
(17.78) (6.09)
0.169 0.067
0.022
(3.78)
0.009
0.130
(4.54)
0.051
0.046
(4.54)
0.051
-0.0004
(3.79)
-0.0002
0.020
(0.69)
0.008
c
-3.822
(21.19)
0.266
(9.87)
0.105
0.070
(12.92)
0.028
0.185
(6.61)
0.073
0.082
(9.43)
0.033
-0.0008
(7.47)
-0.0003
-0.212
(7.96)
-0.084
d
-11.17
(27.24)
0.111
(3.68)
0.044
-0.010
(1.42)
-0.004
0.084
(2.75)
0.033
0.024
(2.39)
0.009
-0.0002
(1,54)
-0.0001
0.165
(4.84)
0.065
(continued)
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Table 6.2 (continued)
Variable a
FIRM SIZE:
25-99
10CM99
500-999
1000+
UNION MEMBER
LN(ANNUALWAGE 
INCOME)
PREDICTED ANNUAL 
INCOME
b
0.575
(12.48)
0.227
0.851
(19.23)
0.336
1.041
(17.87)
0.411
1.308
(33.10)
0.517
0.439
(11.25)
0.173
0.608
(23.90)
0.240
c
0.615
(13.68)
0.243
0.919
(21.23)
0.363
1.149
(20.13)
0.454
1.405
(36.52)
0.555
0.494
(12.92)
0.195
d
0.519
(10.65)
0.205
0.771
(16.37)
0.305
0.935
(14.98)
0.370
1.186
(27.81)
0.469
0.400
(9.57)
0.157
0.983
(20.52)
0.390
aThe top row for each variable is the probit coefficient, while the bottom row is the partial deriva 
tive evaluated at the sample mean of the independent variable. It represents how a one-unit 
change in the independent variable changes the predicted probability of pension coverage. The 
absolute value of the f-statistic for the probit coefficient is in parentheses. Sample size = 11,269 
observations.
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Nevertheless, the likelihood of pension coverage is greater for trained 
workers, independent of higher wages.
A problem with including wage income as a regressor is the endoge- 
neity of pension coverage and wages. While more highly compensated 
employees have a higher tax-induced demand for pension coverage, to 
the extent that other variables control for the worker's total compensa 
tion, theory predicts a trade-off between any nonwage benefit and cur 
rent wages. That is, a higher likelihood of pension coverage should 
result in lower current wages, and the sign of the income coefficient is 
ambiguous. We have explored the latter issue elsewhere (Dorsey 
1982).
Our concern here is whether or not the training coefficient is sensi 
tive to the endogeneity of wage income. Column d reports estimates of 
the model when actual wage income is replaced with an instrumental 
variable, predicted annual wage income. 5 The larger coefficient on the 
instrument compared to actual income is consistent with findings in a 
previous study (Dorsey 1982). The training coefficient declines when 
the income instrument is used, but it still is positive and statistically 
significant.
The positive training estimate also is robust to specifications that 
control for industry and occupation. Table 6.3 lists estimates obtained 
from the pension coverage model but with the addition of 5 industry 
and 11 occupation dummy variables. Not surprisingly, the estimate of 
the training coefficient is smaller, but again, it reveals a positive rela 
tionship.
These results leave little doubt that there is an empirical link 
between pension coverage and training. This is evidence consistent 
with the incentive function of pensions, especially given the controls 
for income and other worker and firm characteristics. There are other 
interpretations of the correlation between pensions and training, how 
ever, such as pensions as an efficiency wage or other variants of a 
"good jobs-bad jobs" view of the labor market. The rest of this chapter 
presents further tests of the incentive theory of pensions and training. 
First, we examine the relationship between pension coverage and dif 
ferent types of training. Second, we ask whether training increases the 
likelihood of defined-benefit as opposed to defined-contribution pen 
sion coverage.
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Table 6.3 Probit Pension Coverage Estimates with Industry and 
Occupation Controls3
Variable
Intercept
TRAINING AT CURRENT JOB
EDUCATION
MARRIED, SPOUSE PRESENT
AGE
AGE SQUARED
FEMALE
FIRM SIZE
25-99
100-499
500-999
1000+
UNION MEMBER
LN(ANNUALWAGE INCOME)
OCCUPATION
MANAGER/PROFESSIONAL
TECHNICAL/SALES
a
-1.266
(7.43)
0.082
(7.43)
0.022
(7.97)
0.060
(5.35)
0.030
(8.53)
-0.0007
(6.75)
-0.086
(7.27)
0.222
(12.16)
0.329
(18.64)
0.420
(18.21)
0.533
(33.25)
0.197
(12.36)
0.075
(3.78)
0.058
(3.19)
b
-1.499
(19.35)
0.057
(5.04)
0.009
(3.29)
0.046
(4.01)
0.018
(4.96)
-0.0001
(3.69)
-0.005
(0.36)
0.211
(11.45)
0.306
(17.05)
0.382
(16.31)
0.499
(30.44)
0.169
(10.46)
0.223
(21.14)
-0.013
(0.65)
0.017
(0.93)
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Variable
SERVICE
FARMING/FORESTRY
PRECISION/CRAFT
INDUSTRY
Agriculture
Mining
Construction
Durable manufacturing
Transport/Utilities
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Banking/Insurance
Business services
Personal services
Entertainment
Professional services
a
-0.097
(3.88)
-0.052
(0.65)
0.029
(1.47)
-0.241
(3.00)
0.038
(0.79)
-0.128
(4.31)
-0.003
(0.19)
-0.062
(2.55)
-0.064
(2.29)
-0.216
(10.01)
-0.030
(1.26)
-0.148
(5.44)
-0.324
(8.21)
-0.241
(4.08)
-0.072
(3.37)
b
-0.071
(2.81)
-0.023
(0.27)
-0.003
(0.13)
-0.228
(2.76)
-0.006
(0.12)
-0.144
(4.78)
-0.010
(0.50)
-0.080
(3.21)
-0.077
(2.71)
-0.181
(8.18)
-0.027
(1.09)
-0.142
(5.10)
-0.294
(7.30)
-0.222
(3.66)
-0.047
(2.11)
aFor brevity, we do not report the probit coefficients in this table. The estimates shown are the 
partial derivatives of the independent variable, evaluated at the mean of the independent variables, 
and the absolute value of the /-statistics (in parentheses). The excluded occupational group is 
operators/laborer, while the excluded industry is nondurable manufacturing.
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GENERAL VS. SPECIFIC TRAINING
The prediction that employers use pensions to discourage quits of 
trained workers applies primarily to firm-specific training. Human 
capital theory predicts that the costs of general training, skills which 
are easily transferable to other firms, will be borne by the worker. If 
training is completely general, the firm will not invest in its employees 
and will be unconcerned about quits. The quit penalty makes sense 
only when the firm invests in its workers, i.e., when training is firm- 
specific. Testing this implication is difficult, unfortunately, because a 
clean distinction between general and specific training is not available 
in this, or any other, survey of training.
However, the type and location categories of training reported in 
Table 6.1 should reflect differences in the transferability of skills. 
Reading, math, writing, and computer-related training arguably are 
easily transferred across firms. Managerial and supervisory skills also 
would seem to be highly portable. On the other hand, workers who 
have received firm-specific training would be most likely to report this 
as "other technical skills specific to the occupation."6 The location of 
training also may reflect differences in specificity. Programs at an out 
side classroom suggest general skills, while informal OJT is more 
likely to focus on firm-specific needs.
If these categorizations are accurate, workers' responses should be 
consistent by type and place. Table 6.4 lists Pearson correlation coeffi 
cients between training place and type for all workers who reported 
receiving some training. As expected, the weakest correlation for the 
occupation-specific category is with training outside the firm. We also 
expected to find that the strongest correlation for informal OJT would 
be with occupation-specific training, and the weakest with reading, 
math, and writing skills. While these categories are clearly imperfect, 
they should be a useful proxy.
We tested the specific-training hypothesis by replacing the single 
training variable with a set of dummy variables for type and place of 
training. We expect that occupation-specific training and informal OJT 
will have larger coefficients in the pension coverage model than other 
training categories. Table 6.5 reports coefficient estimates for each of 
the training categories.7 The results for type of training are mixed. An
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Table 6.4 Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Training by Type 
and Place
Reading, Occupation- 
Training math, etc. Computer Managerial specific
Outside school
Company classroom
Informal OJT
0.191
0.067
0.020
0.131
0.175
0.052
0.073
0.201
0.001
0.013
0.067
0.070
expected result is that workers who received training in basic language 
and math or managerial skills—general training—were not signifi 
cantly more likely than untrained workers to have a pension. Occupa 
tion-specific training, in contrast, is positively related to pension 
coverage. However, the largest coefficient is for computer training, 
which we judge to be quite general.
Column b shows the results when training is broken out by place. 
The coefficient on formal company training is larger than that for train 
ing received outside the firm. However, the place of training most 
likely to convey nontransferable skills, informal OJT, has the weakest 
relationship with training.
HEALTH AND RETIREMENT SURVEY
A more powerful test of the incentive theory of pensions can be 
made by distinguishing between defined-benefit and defined-contribu- 
tion coverage. If the explanation for the positive relationship between 
pensions and training is tenure and retirement incentives, training 
should be associated with a greater likelihood of defined-benefit cover 
age. Unfortunately, the March CPS pension data does not distinguish 
coverage by plan type. Information on type of coverage is available in 
the pension supplement to the May 1988 CPS, but this file cannot be 
matched to the 1991 CPS training supplement.
Given the lack of direct information on plan type in the 1991 CPS 
surveys, we have employed the 1992 Health and Retirement Survey 
(HRS) to examine the impact of training on the defined-benefit/ 
defined-contribution decision. An important advantage of the HRS is
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Table 6.5 Pension Coverage Model with Controls for Place and Type 
of Training3
Training by type
Reading, math, etc.
Computer
Managerial
Occupation-specific
Other
0.093
(1.52)
0.037
0.201
(4.93)
0.080
0.042
(0.96)
0.017
0.136
(4.36)
0.054
-0.022
(0.41)
-0.009
Training by place
Outside company, classroom
At company, formal 
At company, informal 
Other
0.099
(2.39) 
0.039 
0.245
(6.88) 
0.097 
0.052
(1.45) 
0.020 
0.096
(1.77) 
0.038
aThese pension coverage models also include as regressors years of education, gender, marital sta 
tus, firm size, age and age-squared, union membership, and annual wage income. The specifica 
tion is identical to that for equation a (column a in Table 6.3) but with the expanded training 
variables. The top row for each variable is the probit coefficient, while the bottom row is the par 
tial derivative evaluated at the sample mean of the independent variable. It represents how a one- 
unit change in the independent variable changes the predicted probability of pension coverage. 
The absolute value of the f-statistic for the probit coefficient is in parentheses. Sample size = 
11,269 observations.
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that it includes information on pension plan type as well as a measure 
of training (the respondent's opinion regarding the number of years of 
experience beyond formal schooling to achieve proficiency in her job).
For the analysis, we restricted the HRS sample to wage and salary 
workers, aged 51-61, who reported usually working at least 35 hours 
per week. In order to exclude as many public-sector workers as possi 
ble, we also deleted workers in the public administration industry 
(unlike the CPS, there is no public-sector status variable in the HRS). 
Thus the HRS sample restrictions are the same as the CPS restrictions, 
except for the incomplete exclusion of public-sector workers. The 
sample consists of 3,990 employees.
Table 6.6 reports estimates of the determinants of two models of 
pensions: 1) pension coverage, and 2) defined-benefit coverage, given 
that the worker has a pension. The first column reports the pension 
coverage equation results for comparison with the previously reported 
CPS-based findings. The coefficient estimates on the control variables 
are consistent. Education, employment at a larger establishment, being 
married, and union membership each increase the likelihood of being 
covered by a pension. Most importantly, we estimate that workers with 
the mean years of training (3.56 years) are 7 percent more likely to 
have a pension than workers with no training. This is virtually identi 
cal to our finding in the CPS data.
The second column reports estimates of the type of coverage for a 
sample restricted to workers who have a pension. The dependent vari 
able is equal to unity if workers reported primary coverage under a 
defined-benefit pension plan; zero, if coverage was defined-contribu- 
tion.
The results indicate that union members and employees of large 
establishments are more likely to be covered under a defined-benefit 
plan. These results are consistent with previous estimates of the deter 
minants of plan type (Dorsey 1987). For our purposes, the most conse 
quential result is the positive coefficient on the training variable. From 
the quadratic form of the model, we estimated that the mean years of 
training increases the probability of defined-benefit coverage by 2.3 
percentage points compared to workers without training. The coeffi 
cient estimate is significant at the 10 percent confidence level.
This confirms the results reported in Dorsey and Macpherson 
(1997), who constructed a measure of predicted training using 1993
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Table 6.6 Training and Pension Coverage and Defined Benefit Coverage 
Using Health and Retirement Survey Data3
Variable
Intercept
YEARS OF TRAINING
YEARS OF TRAINING SQUARED
YEARS OF EDUCATION
MARRIED, SPOUSE PRESENT
PLANT SIZE:
5-14
15-24
25-99
100-499
500+
Pension coverage"1
-1.083
(0.13)
-0.337
0.074
(6.55)
0.023
-0.003
(6.33)
-0.001
0.093
(11.09)
0.029
0.229
(4.17)
0.071
0.280
(2.74)
0.087
0.525
(4.58)
0.163
0.769
(7.92)
0.239
1.128
(11.33)
0.350
1.519
(14.34)
0.472
Defined-benefit 
coverage0
16.186
(1.75)
5.91
0.021
(1.65)
0.008
-0.001
(1.77)
-0.0004
0.049
(4.95)
0.018
0.116
(1.86)
0.042
0.027
(0.17)
0.010
0.003
(0.01)
0.001
0.076
(0.51)
0.028
0.191
(1.29)
0.070
0.376
(2.53)
0.137
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Variable
UNION MEMBER
AGE
AGE SQUARED/100
FEMALE
Sample size
Pension coverage11
0.883
(14.27)
0.274
-0.021
(0.07)
-0.007
0.011
(0.11)
0.003
-0.006
(0.11)
-0.002
3,990
Defined-benefit 
coverage0
0.784
(13.97)
0.286
-0.615
(1.85)
-0.225
0.553
(1.86)
0.202
0.070
(1.24)
0.025
2,748
aThe top row for each variable is the probit coefficient, while the bottom row is the partial deriva 
tive evaluated at the sample mean of the independent variable. It represents how a one-unit 
change in the independent variable changes the predicted probability of pension coverage. The 
absolute value of the /-statistic for the probit coefficient is in parentheses. 
bThe dependent variable is equal to 1 if covered by a pension and zero otherwise. 
cThe dependent variable is equal to 1 if primary pension coverage is by a defined-benefit plan, and 
zero if by defined-contribution plan.
CPS data and then estimated that this instrument raised the probability 
of defined-benefit coverage. These results, however, were sensitive to 
the variables used to identify the training equation.
This finding is important, because while the pension/training corre 
lation is robust, several theories are capable of explaining this result. 
The relationship between training and defined-benefit coverage, how 
ever, is a more discriminating test. If training was associated with pro 
portionately higher defined-contribution and defined-benefit coverage, 
we could reject the hypothesis that tenure and retirement incentives 
were reasons for the correlation. None of the alternative theories easily 
can explain why workers with training should prefer defined-benefit 
coverage. The relationship is statistically significant but relatively 
weak. Defined-benefit coverage appears to be related to training, but 
the latter is less important than firm size or union status.
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SUMMARY
This chapter has tested one of the channels through which pensions 
raise productivity: encouraging training investments. There is a clear 
empirical connection between pension coverage and job training. 
While data limitations do not allows us to identify causation between 
these two endogenous variables, the hypothesis that pensions and train 
ing are joint outcomes of employment contracts is strongly supported. 
The simple correlation between these two employment outcomes is 
high, and even controlling for wage income and other worker and firm 
characteristics, employees who received training are 7 percent more 
likely to be covered by a pension.
The prediction that pension coverage is more likely to be found 
where training is firm-specific was not confirmed. A ranking of train 
ing coefficient estimates by the degree of specificity was not consis 
tent. We did find, on the other hand, evidence that workers with 
training were more likely to have defined-benefit coverage. This result 
is evidence that pension career incentives have a productivity function. 
It is difficult to explain this result without referencing defined-benefit 
tenure and retirement incentives.
NOTES
1. A good summary of these studies can be found in Gustman, Mitchell, and Stein- 
meier (1994). Some are identified in endnote 4 to Chapter 1 (p. 11).
2. Since the review of training studies in Brown (1990), notable recent efforts 
include Lynch (1992) and Bartel (1995).
3. In his model, training increases lifetime income, which generates a demand for 
pensions due to tax incentives. An implication of this demand-side model is that 
training increases the likelihood of both defined-contribution and defined-benefit 
plans.
4. Altonji and Spletzer (1991), using the NLS of 1972 High School Graduates, 
reported 28 percent receiving formal company training, 20 percent informal OJT, 
and 20 percent attending outside programs. Brown's (1990) survey found a range 
of company-provided training between 5 and 20 percent.
5. The pension coverage equation is identified because several variables that affect 
potential wage income can be excluded from the model of pension choice. The 
regressors in the structural wage equation included TRAINING, EDUCATION, 
MARRIED-SPOUSE PRESENT, AGE, AGE SQUARED, FEMALE, FIRM 
SIZE, UNION, TENURE, TENURE SQUARED, RACE, and INDUSTRY. Race
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and several of the industry dummy variables have a significant effect on wage 
income but not on the likelihood of pension coverage. Reduced-form probit esti 
mates of pension coverage and annual wage income are available from the 
authors.
6. Some training that is reported as "occupation-specific," of course, could be trans 
ferable to other firms employing workers in the same occupation. Our test is 
based upon the idea that this category is more likely to include firm-specific train 
ing.
7 Note that the categories are not exclusive—a large number of observations 
reported training under more than one category.

7 Estimates of Pension Coverage 
and Productivity Differentials
The fundamental issue raised in this monograph is whether pension 
coverage can raise workforce productivity. Unfortunately, there is 
almost no direct evidence on whether firms that sponsor pensions real 
ize productivity gains. This chapter is a step towards closing this gap 
in the empirical literature. The framework for our investigation is a 
production function that includes the firm's pension status as an addi 
tional argument. Estimates of the parameters associated with pension 
status allow us to determine if pension coverage is associated with 
higher labor productivity.
Because restrictions on quit and retirement decisions are costly to 
workers, theory predicts that these incentives must establish productiv 
ity gains at least sufficient to fund a compensating wage premium. If 
not, employers would sponsor incentive-neutral pension plans. If we 
do not find a productivity advantage for firms that sponsor defined-ben- 
efit plans, we can reject the supply-side hypothesis in favor of alterna 
tive theories of pensions, in which pension career incentives are costly 
side-effects.
Our empirical analysis was carried out on a sample of manufactur 
ing firms drawn from the annual Compustat Industrial File that were 
observed over the period 1981-92. Compustat is the only dataset that 
combines information on output, inputs, and pension provision for 
individual firms. In addition, the fact that the sample is a panel—i.e., 
cross section/time series—allowed us to control for fixed unobserved 
firm characteristics that may be correlated with the decision to offer a 
pension plan.
Although the empirical study conducted in this chapter represents 
an advance over previous work, the results should be interpreted with 
the following qualifications in mind. First, one shortcoming of the 
Compustat data is that only firms that offer defined-benefit plans can 
be identified. Distinctions between firms that sponsor defined-contri- 
bution plans and those that do not provide a pension are not possible. 
Given that our sample is made up of large manufacturing firms, how-
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ever, virtually all of those without defined-benefit plans will sponsor 
defined-contribution plans. Thus, the productivity differentials we esti 
mate are between firms offering defined-benefit pensions and those 
offering defined-contribution coverage. Any estimated productivity 
differences should reflect defined-benefit tenure and retirement incen 
tives.
Second, the decision to offer a pension plan clearly is not "exoge 
nous." If the supply-side view of pensions is correct, firms that offer 
coverage will be those with expectations of productivity gains. Panel 
data will help to the extent that certain fixed firm characteristics can 
account for the decision to offer a pension. The pension-offer decision, 
however, may be too complicated to be captured simply through panel 
data estimation techniques. If this is so, a finding that firms with 
defined-benefit plans have higher labor productivity does not imply 
that all firms would benefit from pension incentives. Unfortunately, 
Compustat does not provide enough information to formally model a 
firm's pension sponsorship.
Keep in mind that our primary goal is simply to test whether or not 
firms that choose defined-benefit coverage are more productive. The 
productivity theory does not imply that all firms will experience pro 
ductivity gains. Thus a positive pension coefficient, even if it is a 
biased estimate of the gain from sponsoring a defined-benefit plan for 
all firms, can still support the productivity theory.
A related problem is that the data do not allow tests of the channels 
through which gains may be realized. As we indicated in the first 
chapter, the ideal model would specify empirical connections from 
pension coverage to labor market outcomes; for example, to increased 
training, and then from the latter to improved productivity. The Com 
pustat file does not, however, have information on turnover, training, 
effort, employee education levels, or other wage and human resource 
policies which may affect productivity. Our results will indicate 
whether labor productivity is greater in firms that sponsor defined-ben 
efit coverage, but they cannot provide evidence on the source of these 
gains.
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EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
Empirical Model
The productivity theory of pensions predicts that defined-benefit 
incentives for long tenure and early retirement will raise labor produc 
tivity. Whether and how the provision of defined-benefit pensions 
would affect capital use efficiency is not as clear. One possible channel 
might be complementarities between training and capital. In other 
words, investments in human capital may raise the productivity of cap 
ital equipment. 1
The proposition that defined-benefit pension plans increase produc 
tivity can be tested by estimating a production function that includes 
the firm's pension status as an argument. The general form for such a 
model may be expressed as
Eq. 7.1 Yit =/(*,,, />,,, T)exp(£,,),
where Yit is firm i's (i = 1, ...,#) output in period t (t = 1,. . ., T); xit 
(= xitl , ..., xitf) is a vector of inputs; Pit is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the firm offers a pension plan and 0 otherwise; T is a trend capturing 
technical change (shifts in the production function over time), and e,, is 
a random disturbance term. We also consider a general index for tech 
nical change that substitutes time dummy variables for the trend. The 
time dummies impose very little structure on the production function 
shifts, which may be beneficial when examining the temporal pattern 
of productivity differences. 2
Estimation of the model depends upon a stochastic specification of 
the error term and an assumption about the functional form of the pro 
duction function. The panel nature of our sample leads us to specify 
the disturbance in Eq. 7.1 as
Eq. 7.2 £,-, = a( + vit,
where a, represents unobserved firm-specific characteristics that may 
be correlated with pension status or inputs and vit represents the usual 
statistical noise.
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The simplest assumption for the production function would be that 
technology is Cobb-Douglas, which leads to the following empirical 
model:
j 
Eq.7.3 Iny,, = T0 + I yjlnxitj +
In this case, the productivity differential between firms that do and do 
not offer a pension is a pure intercept shift and is measured by the esti 
mated coefficient of Pit .
A drawback to the Cobb-Douglas model is that it cannot be used to 
test whether pension provision affects productivity differently through 
the capital or labor input. An alternative is to specify a flexible func 
tional form for the production function. The translog functional form 
allows the pension variable to be interacted with the inputs and the 
time trend. The translog version of Eq. 7.1 can be written as
j
Eq.7.4 lnyit = y0 + I yj\nxitj + j^+jpPit 
j= i
1 J J 12+ 2^1 VnVn^* + 2y»T 
j = 1 k - 1
/ J
+ I Kj t toXitji+ Z VnV^ + e" ' 
• j = 1 J = l
where yk = jkj. 
Estimation
How Eq. 7.3 or 7.4 is to be estimated depends on how we treat the 
firm-specific component of the disturbance. The supply-side theory of 
pensions implies that pension status is likely correlated with the «,; that 
is, firms that sponsor defined-benefit plans will be those most likely to 
translate the incentives into productivity gains. The main advantage of 
panel data is that the parameters of the production function can be esti 
mated consistently, even in the presence of such correlation.
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The most straightforward method for dealing with such correlation 
is to assume the a, are fixed in the sample and estimate the production 
function—as specified in Eq. 7.1 or 7.4—conditioning on the effects. 
This can be accomplished by applying ordinary least squares (OLS) to 
model variables that have been transformed into deviations from firm 
means. This is the so-called "within" transformation, because it 
involves only the within-firm variation in the data. Hence, fixed-effects 
estimation requires that there be some time variation in the data. This 
implies that the effect of pensions on productivity will be estimated 
through firms' changes in pension status.
If the effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, more 
statistically efficient estimates can be obtained by treating the a, as a 
set of independent random variables. The random-effects version of 
the model is estimated by generalized least squares (GLS), which can 
also be computed by applying OLS to a simple data transformation. In 
this case, each variable is differenced using a factor that weights the 
contribution of within- and between-firm variation. 3 Thus, ran 
dom-effects estimation does not depend on status changers to identify 
the coefficients of variables involving pension status. Nevertheless, the 
GLS estimates will be inconsistent if the regressors are correlated with 
any of the right-hand-side variables. Fortunately, this assumption can 
be can be tested by contrasting the fixed and random-effects estimates. 4
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Data
Our primary data source is the Compustat Annual Industrial file, 
which provides financial and market information for over 2,400 indi 
vidual firms from 1973 to 1992. Compustat is the only dataset we are 
aware of that combines information on output, inputs, and pension pro 
vision for individual firms. 5 While the Compustat production data is 
available for the full 20 years, the pension data has been recorded only 
since 1981. Hence our sample period is 1981-92, so that T= 12.
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From Compustat we obtain the following empirical measures of 
each firm's output (yit) and inputs (xit). Output is defined as net sales; 
the inputs, which are capital (Kit) and labor (L,-,), are defined as the 
property, plant, and equipment and the number of employees, respec 
tively. Compustat reports both gross and net property, plant, and 
equipment (the latter accounting for depreciation); we estimate our 
models alternating between the two measures. Summary statistics for 
the measures of output and inputs used in our empirical models are 
provided in Table 7.1.
Whether or not a firm offers a defined-benefit pension is not directly 
observable in the Compustat file, but data on plan assets are available. 
Depending on the Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rule in 
force, one or two pension asset variables are recorded. Until 1985, 
firms simply reported net pension assets; from 1985 on, however, a dis 
tinction is made between over- and underfunded plan assets. A posi 
tive value for any one of these variables is indicative that a 
defined-benefit plan is provided. 6 Thus, we set Pit to 1 in any period for 
which a firm has positive pension assets and 0 otherwise. After elimi-
Table 7.1 Means of Variables, by Year3
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
y
($, millions)
1129.17
1097.11
1169.65
1317.02
1437.62
1547.35
1746.67
1950.34
2023.58
2226.13
2256.84
2339.53
Gross K 
($, millions)
615.127
662.462
695.672
738.773
829.977
912.118
1016.66
1087.51
1148.37
1290.92
1390.27
1470.95
Net K 
($, millions)
351.625
374.607
384.711
407.047
456.301
483.960
520.242
556.071
592.188
659.153
694.825
699.366
L 
(thousands)
13.963
13.004
13.380
14.158
14.242
14.309
14.378
15.194
15.448
15.341
14.832
14.222
ay is net sales (gross sales reduced by cash and trade discounts, and returned sales and allowances 
for which credit is given); gross K is the cost of tangible fixed property (plant and equipment) 
used to produce revenue; net K is gross K less accumulated depreciation; and L is the number of 
employees. N= 361.
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nating those firms with missing observations for output, capital, and 
labor, we are left with a balanced panel of 1130 firms.
One strategy would be to estimate our empirical model using all 
1130 firms. However, proceeding as if a single production process 
governs output generation is questionable, because these firms repre 
sent every major industry category. An alternative strategy would be to 
estimate the model separately for each one-digit industry. This is prob 
lematic due to the limited number of firms and the small variation in Pit 
in some industry groups. As a compromise, we concentrate our atten 
tion on manufacturing (the largest one-digit industry category), result 
ing in a 12-year panel of 396 firms.
Given certain vagaries in the reporting of pension asset quantities, 
due in large part to the FASB rule changes, it is possible that some 
firms are misrepresented as terminating their defined-benefit plan dur 
ing the sample period. This type of measurement error is particularly 
troublesome in fixed-effects regressions, so we corroborated the pen 
sion terminations, as revealed by changes in Pit, by referencing the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's (PBGC) notification tape. 7
Based on the notification tape, we could not verify plan cancellation 
for 36 firms. Removing these firms from the sample leaves us with a 
cross-section (N) of 361 firms, 40 of which changed pension status 
from 1981 to 1992. The latter group does not include firms that can 
celed defined-benefit plans only to establish new ones in the same or 
next year. In any case, coverage rates for these manufacturing firms 
remained relatively high over the period, ranging from 70 to 74 per 
cent. Of the 40 changers, 18 dropped plans and 22 added plans. 8 Con 
sistent with Mittelstaedt and Regier (1993), firms that dropped 
coverage had higher funding ratios, lower returns on assets, and 
smaller cash flows than firms that added plans. There was a great deal 
of similarity across these characteristics between firms that added 
plans and those that maintained coverage throughout the period, while 
firms that never offered a pension had lower returns on assets and 
smaller cash flows than either of the former. 9
Estimation Results
In the simplest Cobb-Douglas model (Eq. 7.3), the pension effect is 
a pure intercept shift. In the translog model (Eq. 7.4), input elasticities
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and technical change vary with pension status. The latter is an impor 
tant advantage. Theory predicts that productivity gains should be 
accomplished primarily through the labor input. Results that indicated 
similar productivity effects for labor and capital would be difficult to 
attribute to pension incentives.
We estimate each model under both fixed and random-effects 
assumptions, alternating between the gross and net capital measures, as 
well as trend and general index (time dummy) specifications of techni 
cal change. In each case, we test whether the explanatory variables are 
uncorrelated with the firm effects. A rejection of the null hypothesis 
would support basing inference on the fixed-effects estimates, since 
they are consistent under the alternative.
As a contrast to results obtained from panel data estimation proce 
dures, we also report conventional OLS estimates. Since OLS ignores 
firm-specific unobservables entirely, like GLS, it will yield consistent 
estimates of the production function parameters only if the explanatory 
variables are uncorrelated with the firm effects. However, OLS 
weights the within- and between-firm variation in the data equally, 
whereas the panel data estimators give greater weight to the former. 
Thus, OLS is least dependent on pension status changes in the estima 
tion of the pension coefficients. 10 Putting aside the issue of consis 
tency, the OLS results will provide some indication of the sensitivity of 
the estimated pension effect to treatment of pension status changers.
We now summarize the evidence from our sample on the relation 
ship between pension sponsorship and productivity. Table 7.2 reports 
the estimated pension coefficient from the Cobb-Douglas models. The 
fixed-effects estimates, which control for unobserved firm characteris 
tics, indicate that pension status is a highly significant shifter of the 
production function. The coefficient estimates range from 0.056 to 
0.072, depending on how capital is measured and technical change is 
specified. These estimates imply that the output of defined benefit 
firms is, on average, 6 to 7.6 percent higher than that of firms not offer 
ing a pension.
Both the GLS and OLS results, which do not condition on firm-spe 
cific unobservables, uniformly indicate a smaller pension effect. While 
the random-effects pension coefficient estimates remain positive and 
statistically significant, the OLS estimates suggest firms with pensions 
are less productive. However, when the net measure of capital is
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Table 7.2 Cobb-Douglas Productivity Differentials
Trend model
Gross K measure
Net K measure
General index model
Gross K measure
Net K measure
OLS
-0.0471
(-3.7281)3
-0.0239
(-1.8302)
-0.0475
(-3.7651)
-0.0243
(-1.8569)
Random effects
0.0422
(2.5205)
0.0668
(3.7500)
0.0409
(2.3455)
0.0640
(3.6128)
Fixed effects
0.0610
(3.1244)
0.0724
(3.6631)
0.0560
(2.8915)
0.0679
(3.4609)
aNumbers in parentheses are asymptotic f-statistics.
employed, the estimated OLS pension coefficient is not significant at 
the usual 5 percent level.
In moving from the fixed-effects to the GLS and then to the OLS 
estimator, progressively less (more) weight is given to the within-firm 
(between-firm) variation in the data. Thus, it appears as we rely less on 
pension status changers to identify the pension coefficients, we obtain 
smaller estimates of productivity differences. At the same time, not 
using within-firm information exclusively may lead to inconsistency, 
as described above. In fact, specification tests reject the hypothesis 
that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the effects.
While the evidence on an overall productivity-enhancing effect of 
pensions is somewhat mixed, the results on the connection between 
pensions and the productivity of labor are not. Table 7.3 reports the 
estimated coefficient of the labor-pension status interaction, yLp , as 
obtained from the translog production function. 11 Regardless of the 
estimation procedure, technical change specification, or capital mea 
sure, pension status is shown to have a positive and statistically signifi 
cant impact on the labor elasticity. Thus, whether we control for 
unobserved firm differences (fixed-effects) or not (GLS and OLS), the 
qualitative result remains, with the size of the estimated effect being 
approximately 7 to 16 percent.
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Table 7.3 Effect of Pension Sponsorship on Labor Elasticity
OLS Random effects
aNumbers in parentheses are asymptotic ^-statistics.
Fixed effects
Trend model
Gross K measure
Net K measure
General index model
Gross K measure
Net K measure
0.1570
(6.5204)a
0.0933
(3.9527)
0.1529
(6.3185)
0.0894
(3.7680)
0.0889
(3.7596)
0.1153
(4.9981)
0.0794
(3.3481)
0.1078
(4.6650)
0.0799
(3.2236)
0.1217
(5.0263)
0.0704
(2.8345)
0.1146
(4.7290)
Interestingly, the largest coefficient estimates are generated by OLS 
(using the gross capital measure). On the face of it, this appears diffi 
cult to reconcile with the OLS Cobb-Douglas results in Table 7.2. 
However, as in the Cobb-Douglas model, OLS estimation of the trans 
log produces a negative estimate of the intercept shift term, yp . In this 
case, yp partially offsets the productivity-enhancing effect of pension 
provision on labor.
In sum, the translog estimates provide some evidence that the pres 
ence of a defined-benefit pension plan enhances productivity overall 
and strongly suggest that pensions raise labor productivity. What 
remains is to clarify the magnitude and temporal pattern of the produc 
tivity differential between firms that do and do not offer pensions.
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 list the estimated productivity differentials for
0each period in the sample, as implied by the translog models, using the 
results from the trend and general index specifications, respectively. 12 
The estimated productivity differentials based on the fixed-effects esti 
mates are listed in the last column. Consistent with the fixed-effects 
Cobb-Douglas results, these estimated differentials are positive in 
every case except one. However, the average productivity gains sug 
gested by the translog models are smaller. When technical change is 
modeled in terms of a trend, the mean differential is 4.4 (5.8) percent 
when the gross (net) measure of capital is used. Utilizing a general
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Table 7.4 Translog Productivity Differentials Trend Model
Year OLS Random effects Fixed effects
Gross capital measure
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
Net capital measure
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
-0.0177
-0.0352
-0.0350
-0.0307
-0.0390
-0.0442
-0.0448
-0.0390
-0.0392
-0.0415
-0.0439
-0.0462
0.0361
0.0187
0.0125
0.0076
-0.0047
-0.0136
-0.0195
-0.0227
-0.0300
-0.0362
-0.0410
-0.0471
0.0538
0.0426
0.0414
0.0426
0.0366
0.0323
0.0308
0.0329
0.0316
0.0292
0.0269
0.0246
0.1208
0.0991
0.0914
0.0854
0.0703
0.0593
0.0518
0.0475
0.0380
0.0295
0.0220
0.0134
0.0700
0.0581
0.0551
0.0542
0.0469
0.0412
0.0378
0.0379
0.0350
0.0310
0.0272
0.0234
0.1314
0.1065
0.0963
0.0879
0.0700
0.0563
0.0462
0.0396
0.0275
0.0164
0.0063
-0.0050
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Table 7.5 Translog Productivity Differentials General Index Model
Year OLS Random effects Fixed effects
Gross capital measure
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
Net capital measure
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
0.0049
0.0019
-0.0423
-0.0364
-0.0593
-0.0691
-0.1106
-0.0543
-0.0321
0.0006
-0.0189
-0.0445
0.0604
0.0552
0.0110
0.0113
-0.0227
-0.0495
-0.1007
-0.0443
-0.0229
0.0103
-0.0122
-0.0392
0.0740
0.0620
0.0156
0.0239
0.0180
0.0159
-0.0166
0.0276
0.0487
0.0543
0.0321
0.0085
0.1413
0.1205
0.0690
0.0707
0.0544
0.0354
-0.0053
0.0387
0.0549
0.0560
0.0284
0.0025
0.0908
0.0734
0.0243
0.0316
0.0267
0.0244
-0.0105
0.0300
0.0482
0.0520
0.0278
0.0041
0.1523
0.1227
0.0672
0.0679
0.0532
0.0351
-0.0087
0.0276
0.0400
0.0375
0.0070
-0.0195
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index of technical change causes the mean differential to fall to 3.6 
(4.9) percent.
In the first two columns of Tables 7.4 and 7.5, the implied differen 
tials from the OLS and random-effects regressions are listed. The 
mean random-effects-based differentials are similar in magnitude to 
the those derived from the fixed-effects estimates. The mean differen 
tial is 3.6 (6.3) percent using a trend specification and gross capital and 
3.1 (5.7) percent using a general index. The OLS-based differentials 
are negative for all periods except the early years of the sample period. 
At the mean, the productivity differentials obtained from OLS range 
from -3.9 to -1.1 percent. Recall that even the OLS results, however, 
find a positive effect on labor productivity.
Finally, there is one sense in which all three sets of estimates agree: 
that the temporal pattern of the productivity differential is one of 
steady decline. This is generally true even under the time-dummy 
specification, which does not impose any structure on the temporal pat 
tern of the differential. The decline in the differential parallels the fall 
in defined-benefit coverage during the 1980s.
SUMMARY
This chapter has presented new empirical evidence on the relation 
ship between pensions and productivity. Our empirical framework has 
been a production function that includes the firm's pension status as an 
argument. Using a 12-year panel of Compustat manufacturing firms, 
we estimated the production function under different assumptions 
about functional form, the capital measure, and the role of unobserved 
firm characteristics.
Our main empirical finding is that labor appears to be more produc 
tive in firms with defined-benefit pensions, which is consistent with the 
productivity theory of pensions. This result does not depend on the 
estimation technique or the measure of capital employed. The evi 
dence on the effect of pensions on overall productivity is more mixed. 
Fixed-effects estimation leads to average productivity differentials of 5 
to 8 percent, while estimation procedures that do not control for firm
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unobservables indicate smaller (and in some cases, negative) produc 
tivity differences.
Of course, other stories can be invoked to explain these findings. An 
alternative theory is that defined-benefit coverage may proxy for an 
entire package of human resource policies (sometimes called "best 
practice") that promotes productivity. "Progressive" firms provide 
more generous benefit packages, including pensions, and have more 
enlightened and effective workplace policies^ according to this view. 
High-compensation firms also may attract higher-quality workers and 
have more selective hiring policies. A variant of this idea is that pen 
sion coverage represents an "efficiency wage," and it is this premium 
pay that creates incentives for long tenure or greater effort.
Testing these competing theories would require detailed, firm-level 
data on workforce characteristics, compensation and benefits, and 
other human resource policies. One might argue, however, that differ 
ences in human resource policies between the large firms in our sample 
will be modest. And, if these policies do not change with pension cov 
erage, the fixed-effects estimation should provide a consistent estimate 
of the overall productivity differential.
Finally, regardless of how the estimation is carried out, the data 
reveal a fairly sharp decline in the productivity differentials over the 
sample period. For example, the fixed-effects estimates of the produc 
tivity differential fall from 15 percent in 1981 to essentially zero in 
1992. One implication of this result is that the productivity differences 
between firms that sponsor defined-benefit versus defined-contribution 
plans has narrowed significantly. It is natural to speculate whether the 
diminishing differential is in some way related to the decline in 
defined-benefit coverage that occurred over the same period. An 
intriguing possibility is the implication that the productivity costs of 
switching to a defined-contribution plan generally declined over the 
during the 1980s.
Pensions and Productivity 107
NOTES
1. A similar strategy was used by Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1977) to assess 
the effects of various human resource management practices, such as incentive 
pay and teamwork.
2. The general index of technical change allows for greater temporal flexibility in the 
production function but at the cost of greatly increasing the number of parameters. 
See Baltagi and Griffin (1988).
3. For any variable, say z,-,, this data transformation creates 
zft =lit + 9zi =zit -(l-9)zi , 
where
the deviations from firm means, z i = z it - z- , 
the firm means z • = T~l £.Z.-. ,
oa is the variance of a,-, and
Oy is the variance of vit .
The relationship between the fixed-effects and GLS estimators is easily seen in 
light of this data transformation, since the former can be obtained by setting 9 to 0.
4. The Wu-Hausman test-statistic for null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
regressors and the effects is q' [cov(q XT 1 q , where q is the difference between 
the fixed-effects and random-effects coefficient vectors and cov(q) is the covari- 
•ance matrix of q .
5. These data have been used in a similar fashion by Kruse (1991) and Kumbhakar 
and Dunbar (1993) to examine the productivity effects of ESOPs.
6. We are grateful to Fred Mittelstaedt for his help in interpreting the Compustat pen 
sion data.
7. We thank Dick Ippolito of the PBGC for providing us with a copy of the tape.
8. The essentially equal representation among the plan terminators and new sponsors 
may be surprising. It is possible, however, that some of the firms not confirmed as 
plan terminators through the PBGC termination tape actually did drop coverage. 
In any case, including these firms in our empirical analysis does not alter the 
results in any meaningful way.
9. We computed the funding ratio as net pension assets divided by the sum of vested 
and nonvested benefits, return on assets as the ratio of dividends to assets, and 
cash flow as the ratio of funds from operations to assets.
10. Note that OLS can be understood in terms of the random-effects data transforma 
tion with 9 set to 1, so that z*t = zit = zit + z i • See note 3 above.
1 1 . Note that, in every instance, the restrictions imposed by the Cobb-Douglas func 
tional form are not supported by the data.
12. The expression for the productivity differential is
E(ln y \ P = 1) - £(ln y \ P = 0) = yp + yKPlnKit + yLPlnLit + ytPx, 
where, in the general index model, Dt is substituted for T.

8 Summary and Conclusions
Research on the economics of pensions has yielded several reasons 
why some firms sponsor pensions and others do not. One set of theo 
ries can be labeled broadly as demand-side: employees value pension 
benefits more than current wages. Considerable evidence supports the 
tax theory of pensions. But pensions became popular before there was 
a federal income tax. In addition, the pension plan preferred by most 
firms has features that cannot be explained by favorable tax rules. 
Defined-benefit plans with delayed vesting dominated the pension 
market for decades.
A supply-side conjecture has been that pensions reward employee 
behavior that raises productivity. Since pensions are voluntary, it is 
natural for economists to seek an explanation of pension incentives that 
is grounded in efficiency. This perspective has been encouraged by the 
popularity of internal labor market models, in which gains result from 
long-term employment.
This manuscript has attempted a careful assessment of the produc 
tivity perspective on pensions. We have explored this theory of pen 
sions in three parts. First, the institutional features of pensions were 
reviewed and we demonstrated how pensions penalize early separation 
and late retirement. Second, we compared pension incentives to sever 
ance penalties and retirement bonuses predicted by internal labor mar 
ket models. Third, we reviewed evidence on pensions and reported 
some new empirical results. In this final chapter we summarize what is 
known about pensions and productivity and suggest directions for 
future research.
Our most basic and least controversial result is that defined-benefit 
plans reward long tenure and penalize late retirement. This is hardly 
original. However, we were surprised that career incentives of defined- 
benefit plans have received little attention in the human resource litera 
ture. Also, there is disagreement over whether pension incentives are 
valuable or whether nonportable pensions, in addition to lowering ben 
efits, reduce productive efficiency by locking workers into jobs. The 
latter perspective suggests that defined-benefit separation penalties are 
unintended or unavoidable. Our review suggested, however, that
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defined-benefit incentives could be reduced or eliminated. If the costs 
of nonportability were not offset by gains elsewhere, employers would 
be expected to implement incentive-neutral plans. At the least, 
employers easily could have adopted early vesting before required to 
do so by regulations.
We found that pension incentives generally are consistent with the 
firm-specific training model. The pension quit penalty may serve as a 
severance tax, which discourages workers from moving to jobs where 
their productivity would be lower and, in effect, insures the firm's 
training investments. A problem for this theory, however, is that the 
quit penalty is low for recent hires and may be insufficient to prevent 
quits of workers whose productivity peaks early. The separation pen 
alty also will not, by itself, deter shirking by recent hires. Both of 
these models predict severance payments to encourage early retire 
ment, as indeed would any long-term employment model in which 
wages were inflexible downward. There seems to be general agree 
ment among economists and practitioners that pension retirement 
incentives are valuable.
Unfortunately, there is little clear-cut evidence with which to evalu 
ate the importance of pension incentives or to test the productivity per 
spective against other pension theories. Direct tests of whether 
workers or firms are more productive when pensions are part of the 
compensation package are virtually nonexistent. This shortcoming, 
which extends to wage policies generally, largely reflects data limita 
tions.
The ideal empirical test would be based on a structural model of 
pension coverage, worker behavior, and a production function which 
translated improved employee outcomes to output gains. This model 
would reveal how pension coverage influenced productivity by specify 
ing mechanisms (such as reduced employee turnover or shirking, 
increased training investments, induced retirement, or attracting work 
ers who are inherently more productive) that could be tested directly. 
It also would recognize that pension coverage is endogenous, requiring 
that we estimate pension choices as a function of potential output 
gains, as well as of other firm and employee characteristics suggested 
by demand-side theories of pension coverage. Such a model would be 
capable of comparing the relative importance of the productivity func 
tion with other pension theories.
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The data required to estimate this fully specified model are ambi 
tious. Gustman and Mitchell (1992) list information on firms' output, 
capital inputs, other human resource policies, and financial characteris 
tics, at a minimum. A rich set of employee characteristics also is nec 
essary, not only because individuals differ in productivity but also 
because factors such as income and marital status influence the 
demand for pension coverage. Since many important firm and 
employee characteristics are unobservable, a longitudinal data file 
would be necessary.
No data set came close to allowing us to estimate a structural empir 
ical model. We did report, however, results from a production function 
model, which compared labor productivity in firms that sponsored 
defined-benefit pensions with those that did not. Cross-section and 
panel estimates suggested that defined-benefit plans are associated 
with a more efficient workforce.
We believe that these results are interesting and advance the empiri 
cal literature on pensions, but they clearly fall short of the ideally spec 
ified model. We had no ability to assess the channels through which 
productivity gains were realized, and the data did not allow modeling 
pension plan choice or, in the case of the longitudinal estimates, the 
decision to change plans. Another problem was that, in this sample, 
firms that did not sponsor defined-benefit plans probably had defined- 
contribution pensions. We have raised the possibility that the former 
may promote productivity gains, but we were unable to test for differ 
ences between firms that sponsor a defined-contribution plan and those 
that have no pension.
For the near future, empirical evidence on pensions is likely to be 
indirect or based on reduced-form estimates. We believe that the bulk 
of this evidence supports the conclusion that, for whatever reason, 
workers in jobs with pensions are more productive than uncovered 
workers. In addition to the estimates presented in Chapter 7, several 
studies find that favorable labor market outcomes are associated with 
pensions. There is clear evidence that pension-covered workers 
receive significantly higher wages, and they are less likely to quit or to 
be laid off.
But the channels which generate these outcomes remain largely 
shrouded in a "black box." We investigated one of these channels, 
reporting evidence of a robust relationship between pensions and
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employee training. We also found that training raised the probability 
of defined-benefit coverage, a result consistent with the theory that 
employers use pensions to discourage quits of valued workers. On the 
other hand, we also found that trained workers were more likely to 
have a defined-contribution pension than no coverage. This result may 
reflect that defined-contribution pensions attract "low discounters," 
who are less likely to quit, or that pension benefits are part of an overall 
compensation premium designed to discourage quits. The data do not 
allow us to distinguish between these explanations.
PENSION POLICY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
We do not claim that the suggestive evidence we have reviewed and 
presented supports hard policy recommendations. Research on the 
value of specific pension incentive mechanisms is needed and should 
be at the top of the agenda for research on pensions and productivity. 
Investigating the "black box" would raise our understanding of the 
economics of pensions and inform analysis of the effects of pension 
policy.
Congress has enacted or considered a number of policies which 
would dilute or eliminate pension incentives. These include shortening 
vesting periods, eliminating penalties for late retirement, making pen 
sion service credit under defined-benefit plans transferable, and a series 
of changes to the tax and regulatory codes which have raised the cost 
of administering plans, especially those providing defined benefits. 
The principal policy implication of the productivity perspective on 
pensions is that these policies may have an output cost. It is not possi 
ble, however, to predict with any precision the size of the productivity 
costs of reduced defined-benefit incentives.
This is especially true of policies which apparently have encouraged 
the substitution of defined-contribution coverage. The latter do not 
have tenure or retirement incentives but may be more efficient at 
attracting more productive employees. 401 (k) plans, which have been 
encouraged by regulatory policy, seem to be particularly well-suited 
for this purpose. If this channel is more important, the productivity
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costs of moving to defined-contribution coverage may be minimal; we 
simply do not have enough information about the importance of pen 
sion incentives to make a judgement.
Some policy makers have advocated reduction or elimination of 
favorable tax treatment of private-sector pension compensation in gen 
eral. The revenue loss from this "tax expenditure" is over $25 billion, 
one of the largest in the federal income tax code, and is a tempting tar 
get for revenue enhancement. Defenders of the pension tax subsidy 
have emphasized the importance of pensions in providing retirement 
income security, but there also may be some productivity costs from 
policies that reduce the attractiveness of defined-benefit and defined- 
contribution coverage.
At the same time, the productivity hypothesis suggests that coverage 
is not solely a function of a favorable tax code. Many firms would con 
tinue to sponsor pensions, even if the tax subsidy were eliminated, just 
as pension sponsorship grew early in the century before the federal 
income tax was enacted.
The current lack of understanding of the channels through which 
pensions may encourage productivity makes it difficult to predict the 
future of defined-benefit plans. Primary defined-benefit coverage has 
declined steadily over the past two decades. Evidence suggests that 
this reflects structural changes in the labor market and policies that 
have raised the relative cost and lowered tax advantages of defined- 
benefit coverage. Defined-contribution growth has occurred primarily 
in sectors where productivity gains from defined-benefit incentives 
were arguably smaller. We conclude that the trend to primary defined- 
contribution coverage is not prima facie evidence of a declining impor 
tance for productivity incentives.
Yet we do not have direct evidence that incentives are a major factor 
in continued sponsorship of defined-benefit plans by larger firms. Are 
tenure and retirement incentives, along with demand-side benefits such 
as insurance and risk-shifting, large enough to maintain an important 
market share for defined-benefit pensions? The future of defined-bene 
fit plans is made more uncertain by the apparent substitution of 401 (k) 
plans, which may have productivity advantages of their own, by firms 
that would otherwise been likely to sponsor the traditional defined- 
benefit plans. 401 (k) plans have opened avenues for further growth of 
primary defined-contribution coverage.
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Clearly, significant progress in testing theories of pensions requires 
a rich data set along the lines suggested by Gustman and Mitchell. 
However, it is questionable if even a major investment in new data 
would allow estimation of a fully specified structural model of pension 
coverage and its effects. Firm- and individual-specific effects will be 
of critical importance in measuring productivity differences, as will 
other factors that affect the supply and demand for pension coverage. 
The problem is that these factors are difficult to measure even with 
detailed data on individuals and firms. What is a good proxy for an 
internal rate of discount or the degree of risk preference? What job 
characteristics suggest the extent of potential gains from firm-specific 
training or early retirement? The inherent difficult of measuring these 
attributes makes it a challenge to create reliable instruments to identify 
the structural parameters of a pension model.
It is likely that better data for testing pension theories will come as a 
by-product of research on productivity effects of more general com 
pensation policies. We have noted the lack of evidence on the incen 
tive effects of merit pay, bonuses, wage-seniority profiles, gainsharing, 
and other human resource policies. A data set capable of testing for 
these more direct incentives must meet the requirements described 
above. While research on these issues is a high priority, we would urge 
investigators to include as much information as possible on pension 
policies when gathering data on employer compensation policies.
Short of exploiting the ideal data set, there may be opportunities for 
more powerful reduced-form or indirect tests of pension/productivity 
channels. Our test of the relationship between pensions and training 
was crude. More refined estimates would be possible with detailed 
firm-level data on pension rules and the type and level of training. 
Recall that the ideal quit penalty matches the value of the firm's invest 
ment, implying greater pension losses in jobs where the firm-specific 
investments are greater. Another testable prediction with better train 
ing data is that, since the pension loss typically peaks late in the career, 
defined-benefit coverage should be more likely in jobs where training 
is gradual and productivity peaks late in the career.
While it is widely accepted that pensions can encourage early with 
drawal of older workers from the labor force, not much is known about 
the value of this incentive. Considerable evidence indicates that work 
ers respond to retirement incentives, but there is almost no evidence on
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why some firms establish these incentives and others do not. Empirical 
evidence on whether retirement incentives reflect gains from early 
retirement would raise our understanding of defined-benefit plans. An 
example of such a test would be whether or not pension retirement 
incentives are more likely in jobs where human capital skills depreciate 
more rapidly.
Our impression is that research on whether pensions attract workers 
who are inherently more productive (low discounters) has the greatest 
potential. This conjecture is suggested by several pension studies that 
find favorable outcomes related to defined-contribution plans. Empiri 
cal labor studies have shown that unobservable, individual-specific 
attributes have major effects on wages and other outcomes. Finally, 
research from the field of psychology has suggested that one of the 
unobservable differences that may be associated with important differ 
ences in success is an individual's willingness to delay gratification. If 
the latter is true, potential gains from attracting such patient workers 
probably are much larger than those created by tenure and retirement 
incentives. But there is no concrete evidence that pension selectivity 
incentives are important.
Another avenue to increasing our understanding of pensions and 
productivity, short of a structural model, is the case study. While not 
widely used by economists, case studies are relatively common in the 
management literature, so we were surprised to find no analyses of 
organizations that sponsored pension plans. Case studies are by defini 
tion narrow in scope and the results are difficult to generalize, but 
given our ignorance about the effects of specific pension incentives and 
the size of resulting productivity gains (if any), this method may yield 
useful information.
There should be plenty of opportunities to observe effects of 
changes in pension incentives, since many firms recently have 
switched from defined-benefit to defined-contribution coverage. A 
case study could address such questions as: Why did the firm change 
coverage? Were productivity consequences considered? Have there 
been measurable effects on quit rates, retirement, and labor productiv 
ity? Has the sponsor adopted other incentives to encourage early 
retirement? Results from well-chosen case studies may direct some 
light on the "black box" and suggest the most promising approaches 
for future research on pensions and productivity.
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